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AN ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES:
BILY v. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.
INTRODUCTION
Since Judge Benjamin Cardozo's seminal 1931 opinion in UI-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,' the role and responsibility
of the accountant has been a source of debate.' A byproduct of this
debate is the issue of whether and to what extent an accountant can
be held liable in negligence to third parties who rely on information
provided by the accountant. Ultramares, which held that privity is
required for a third-party lender to recover in a negligence action,3
was the cornerstone for the development of accountant fraud and
negligence liability in the United States. Although the decision still
maintains a loyal following, as the accounting function has evolved
accountants' liability has gradually expanded, resulting in a wider
range of third parties in negligence actions."
1. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
2. E.g., Werner F. Ebke, In Search of Alternatives: Comparative Reflections on Corporate
Governance and the Independent Auditor's Responsibilities, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 663 (1984); T. J.
Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REV. 31
(1975); Thomas L. Gossman, The Fallacy of Expanding Accountants' Liability, 1988 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 213; Willis W. Hagen II, Accountants' Common Law Negligence Liability to Third
Parties, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 181 [hereinafter Hagen, Accountants' Liability]; Willis W.
Hagen II, Certified Public Accountants' Liability for Malpractice: Effect of Compliance with
GAAP and GAAS, 13 J. CONTEMP. L. 65 (1987) [hereinafter Hagen, Effect of Compliance];
Brian K. Kirby & Thomas L. Davies, Accountant Liability: New Exposure for an Old Profession,
36 SD. L. REV. 574 (1991); Michael A. Mess, Accountants and the Common Law: Liability to
Third Parties, 52 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 838 (1977); Samuel S. Paschall, Liability to Non-Clients:
The Accountant's Role and Responsibility, 53 Mo. L. REV. 693 (1988); John A. Siliciano, Negli-
gent Accounting and the Limits of Instrumental Tort Reform, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1929 (1988);
Howard B. Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233 (1983); Brian J. Frank, Comment, Adjusting Ac-
countants' Liability for Negligence: Recovery for Reasonably Foreseeable Users of Financial
Statements, 13 U. BALT. L REV. 301 (1984); Alan F. Garrison, Note, Common Law Malpractice
Liability of Accountants to Third Parties, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 187 (1987); Robert E. Pace,
Note, Negligent Misrepresentation and the Certified Public Accountant: An Overview of Common
Law Liability to Third Parties, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 431 (1984); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Anno-
tation, Liability of Independent Accountant to Investors or Shareholders, 35 A.L.R. 4th 225
(1991).
3. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.
4. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (using the "reasonably foreseeable"
approach to include more third parties in the accountant's duty of care); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v.
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Today, state courts apply one of three major approaches in deter-
mining the extent to which a negligent accountant or auditor is lia-
ble to relying third parties. These approaches are: (1) extending lia-
bility only to those third parties who are in contractual privity with
the accountant; 5 (2) limiting liability to a specific and narrow class
of third parties whom the accountant actually foresees;6 and (3) ex-
tending liability to reasonably foreseeable third parties.
This Note begins by discussing the expanded role and responsibil-
ity of accountants in today's society.8 Although an audit report is
addressed to a company's management, its primary purpose today is
often to influence the actions of third party investors and lenders.
This Note then describes the historical background of the account-
ant's common law liability for negligence as it evolved from the
strict privity approach of Ultramares to the current trend of holding
Certified Public Accountants ("CPAs") responsible to reasonably
foreseeable third parties.9
Next, this Note critically examines the recent California Supreme
Court decision in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.10 and discusses the
logical implications of this decision." Finally, the Note criticizes the
Bily case as taking a step backwards with regard to accountant lia-
bility, and instead advocates the application of a traditional negli-
gence philosophy to accountants' negligence liability by employing
the reasonably foreseeable approach.
I. THE ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ACCOUNTANT
Although accountants are selected and compensated by their cli-
Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 145 (N.J. 1983) (applying the "reasonably foreseeable" approach); see also
infra notes 139-70, 171-216 and accompanying text (discussing the Restatement (Second) stan-
dard and the "reasonably foreseeable" approach, respectively).
5. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448. Judge Cardozo elegantly singled out accountants for protec-
tion with the privity doctrine, while recognizing that the privity requirement had virtually disap-
peared in most other areas. Id.; see infra notes 101-137 and accompanying text (discussing the
Ultramares doctrine).
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see infra notes 139-70 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
7. E.g., Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 145; see also infra notes 171-216 and accompanying text
(discussing the "reasonably foreseeable" approach).
8. See infra notes 13-95 and accompanying text (discussing the function and process of an
audit).
9. See infra notes 96-216 and accompanying text (describing the historical background of
accountant liability and the three approaches for determining whether liability attaches).
10. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
11. See infra notes 217-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Bily decision in detail).
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ents, their obligations and responsibilities may extend beyond the
client to third-party investors or lenders.12
A. The Audit Function and Process
While accountants provide an array of services to clients, today
the primary function of a CPA"3 is auditing." Simply put, an audit
is performed to verify an entity's financial statements;15 this is done
by examining accounting records and supporting evidence during an
audit engagement." In an audit engagement, the auditor conducts
an independent examination of the financial statements prepared by
a client' 7 and expresses an opinion as to whether such statements
fairly represent the company's actual financial position and opera-
tions in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
("GAAP").'8 The audited company then uses this audit report for
12. Travis M. Dodd, Accounting Malpractice and Contributory Negligence: Justifying Dispa-
rate Treatment Based Upon the Auditor's Unique Role, 80 GEO. L.J. 909, 909 (1992).
13. The terms "CPA," "accountant," and "auditor" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note. An accountant is a "[pierson who works in [the] field of accounting and is skilled in
keeping books or accounts." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 19 (6th ed. 1990). An auditor is "[olne
who checks the accuracy, fairness, and general acceptability of accounting records and statements
and then attests to them." Id. at 131. A CPA is an individual who is certified by a state board of
accountancy. Each state board grants the CPA certificate to those who demonstrate their compe-
tence (I) by passing the national examination administered by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants ("AICPA"), and (2) by satisfying educational and practical experience re-
quirements. ANTHONY PHILLIPS ET AL., BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 64 (4th ed. 1988);
ROBERT 0. BERGER. JR.. PRACTICAL ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 5-7 (1981).
14. See Gossman, supra note 2, at 213 ("For several decades, the most common service offered
by large accounting firms has been auditing."); Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 66
(explaining that although a CPA performs tax and management advisory services, a CPA's pri-
mary function is auditing).
15. The four basic financial statements are: (1) the balance sheet, (2) the income statement,
(3) the statement of retained earnings, and (4) the cash flow statement.
16. Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 66.
17. Management, not the auditors, prepares the financial statements. Phillip R. Lochner, Jr.,
Black Days for Accounting Firms, J. ACCT., Aug. 1992, at 105, 108. Typically, auditors sample
and test numbers from the financial statements prepared by the client. Id.
18. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFESSIONAL STAN-
DARDS AU § 110.01, at 61 (1993) [hereinafter AICPA STANDARDS]; see also Paschall, supra
note 2, at 698-99 (describing the function of an audit); Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1931-32
(describing the audit process).
"Generally accepted accounting principles," or "GAAP," has been defined broadly as "a techni-
cal accounting term which encompasses the conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define
accepted accounting practice at a particular time." AICPA STANDARDS, supra. AU § 411.02, at
485; see also MARTIN A. MILLER. COMPREHENSIVE GAAP GUIDE (1992) (containing all the
promulgated and nonpromulgated accounting principles in use today, and providing explanations
and in-depth illustrations of the application of specific accounting principles).
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its own business planning. 19 In addition, the audit report is used to
inform outside parties as to the financial health of the audited
company.20
For practical reasons of cost and time, an auditor is rarely able to
examine every accounting transaction of a business.2' Therefore, the
performance of an audit requires a high degree of professional skill
and judgment, as the auditor can only test the output of the entity's
accounting systems.2 In performing an audit, an auditor follows
procedures referred to as generally accepted auditing standards
("GAAS"). 3 Initially, a CPA plans an audit by assessing the cli-
ent's business operations and accounting systems. 4 With this knowl-
edge in hand, the accountant begins by making preliminary plan-
ning decisions regarding the scope, methods, and procedures which
will be employed throughout the audit.2 5 The auditor then evaluates
the internal control structure2" of the client2" and chooses whether
or not to place reliance on some or all of the internal control systems
of the client, thereby reducing the need to test actual transactions
and account balances. But in order to rely on the client's internal
controls, the auditor must perform procedures which will determine
if the entity's system of internal controls is functioning properly.2
19. Paschall, supra note 2, at 699.
20. Id. A company's audited financial statements give the user an assurance that the financial
status of the company is accurately represented in the financial statements. Id.
21. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 749 (Cal. 1992); see also PHILLIPS ET AL.,
supra note 13, at 64 (stating that an examination of 100 percent of the records is too time-
consuming and costly).
22. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749.
23. See generally MARTIN A. MILLER & LARRY P. BAILEY. COMPREHENSIVE GAAS GUIDE
11.04-11.05 (1992) (detailing these procedures).
24. Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 67; see also AICPA STANDARDS, supra note
18, AU § 311, at 229-31 (providing planning and supervision standards). Audit planning involves
developing an overall strategy for the expected conduct and scope of the audit. To accurately plan
the audit, the auditor must acquire knowledge of the nature of the entity's business and opera-
tions. Id.
25. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749. For a discussion of the auditor's planning requirements, see AICPA
STANDARDS, supra note 18, AU §§ 311-12, at 229-31; Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note
2, at 67.
26. The "internal control structure policies and procedures relevant to an audit" are defined as
the policies and procedures that "pertain to the entity's ability to record, process, summarize, and
report financial data consistent with management's assertions embodied in the financial state-
ments." AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 319.67, at 282. See generally AICPA STAN-
DARDS. supra note 18, AU § 319, at 265-88 (discussing the consideration of the internal control
structure in a financial statement audit).
27. Bily, 834 P.2d at 749; Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 68.
28. JERRY D. SULLIVAN ET AL.. MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 235 (10th ed. 1985). These proce-
dures are known as "tests of controls." AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 319.67, at 283.
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As a result, transactions and data are sampled, confirmed, verified,
and traced through the client's records.29
Auditing standards require an auditor to obtain "[s]ufficient com-
petent evidential matter ... through inspection, observation, in-
quiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for an opin-
ion regarding the financial statements under audit. '30  The
"sufficient competent evidential matter" requirement does not mean
that the auditor must examine 100 percent of the books, records,
and supporting documents of the client. Instead, it only requires au-
dit sampling.3 As the word implies, "sampling" embodies examina-
tion of less than all of the client's records. Thus, there is some de-
gree of uncertainty implicit in the concept of a "reasonable basis"
for an opinion as referred to above.32
Throughout the audit process, the auditor's findings are examined
and procedures are reevaluated and modified to reflect the auditor's
discoveries. 3 Throughout each step of the audit, the auditor is con-
stantly examining his findings to determine whether additional tests
and procedures are required to give the auditor a "reasonable basis"
for expressing an opinion on the financial statements. For instance,
"if the auditor discovers weaknesses in the internal control system of
the client, the auditor must plan additional audit procedures which
will satisfy himself that the internal control weaknesses have not
caused any material misrepresentations in the financial state-
ments." '34 For example, if the auditor discovers that the client allows
the same person to both prepare and sign company checks, this
would indicate a weakness in the client's internal control procedures.
Upon discovering such a weakness, the auditor would plan addi-
tional audit procedures to satisfy himself that this weakness has not
caused any material misrepresentations in the client's financial
statements, such as nonexistent vendor expense accounts. 5
The end result of an audit is the audit report, or "opinion," which
evaluates the information obtained to determine whether the client's
29. Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 66-67.
30. AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 18, AU § 350.04, at 463-3 (emphasis added).
31. Id. AU § 350.03, at 463. There are two basic approaches to audit sampling: statistical and
nonstatistical. Id.
32. Id. AU § 350.07, at 463-3.
33. See Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 67-68 (describing the need for continu-
ous reevaluations throughout the audit process).
34. Id. (footnotes omitted).
35. Id.
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financial statements fairly represent the financial position of the
business in accordance with GAAP 6 The audit opinion is expressed
in a letter addressed to the client"7 and can be one of four types: an
unqualified opinion, a qualified opinion, an adverse opinion, or a dis-
claimer opinion."
An unqualified opinion, 9 which is the focus of this Note, is the
most frequently issued opinion.4 The unqualified opinion is an ex-
pression of opinion by a CPA without any exceptions, reservations,
or qualifications that the financial statements of the audited business
fairly represent its financial position and the results of its
operations.41
In a qualified opinion,42 on the other hand, the CPA states that
36. AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 18, AU § 110.01, at 61; Paschall, supra note 2, at 701; see
Wiener, supra note 2, at 237-38 (explaining that the auditor's report "normally forms the basis
for any assertion of liability against [the CPA]," because it usually contains representations that
he has conducted the audit in accordance with GAAS and that the financial statements are
presented in accordance with GAAP); see also infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (defining
GAAS in further detail and illustrating the effects of an accountant's departure from GAAS).
37. Bily v. Authur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 750 (Cal. 1992); see AICPA STANDARDS,
supra note 18, AU § 509.09, at 654 (stating that the report may be addressed to the audited
company, the board of directors, or the company's stockholders).
38. Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 69.
39. The standard unqualified opinion, which is addressed to the company's board of directors
and shareholders, currently reads as follows:
[introductory paragraph]
We have audited the accompanying balance sheet of X Company as of December 31,
19XX, and the related statements of income, retained earnings, and cash flows for the
year then ended. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Company's
management. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements
based on our audit.
[Scope paragraph]
We conducted our audit in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement.
An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and
disclosures in the financial statements. An audit also includes assessing the accounting
principles used and significant estimates made by management, as well as evaluating
the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audit provides a rea-
sonable basis for our opinion.
[Opinion Paragraph]
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all mate-
rial respects, the financial position of X Company as of [at] December 31, 19XX, and
the results of its operations and its cash flows for the year then ended in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles.
AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 508.08, at 653.
40. See Dodd, supra note 12, at 915 (stating that an unqualified report is the typical and most
favorable report).
41. Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 69; Paschall, supra note 2, at 701.
42. The qualified opinion includes an explanatory paragraph which must fully describe the rca-
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an improper accounting treatment has been applied to one or more
items and that, consequently, the financial statements are not in
compliance with GAAP. This means that "except for" or "subject
to" that particular matter, the financial statements do fairly present
the financial position of that entity.4" A qualified opinion is usually
issued when there are restrictions on the scope of the auditor's ex-
amination,44 a lack of competent evidential matter,45 a departure
from GAAP,4" changes in the accounting principles applied,41 or
significant uncertainties that affect the client's financial
statements.48
A CPA will issue an adverse opinion49 if any items have a mate-
rial and pervasive effect on the financial statement, thus destroying
their fairness of presentation.5" An adverse opinion states that "the
financial statements . . .do not present fairly, in conformity with
generally accepted accounting principles, the financial position ...
or the results of its operations or its cash flows for the year then
ended."'"
A disclaimer opinion is a statement that the accountant does not
sons for the qualified opinion, including the effects or potential effects of the qualification on the
financial statements. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 508.39, at 662. The relevant por-
tion in the opinion paragraph of a qualified opinion states: "In our opinion, except for ...the
financial statements . . . present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of X Com-
pany . . . in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles." Id. AU § 508.44, at 663.
43. Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 70; Paschall, supra note 2, at 701.
44. A restriction on the scope of the auditor's examination would be the inability to obtain
financial statements supporting foreign affiliate investments. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18,
AU § 508.42, at 662.
45. An example of a lack of competent evidential matter would be a lack of confirmation of the
company's accounts receivable as of the end of the year. Id.
46. An example of a departure from GAAP would be a failure to report the property and debt
from certain lease obligations. Id. AU § 508.54, at 665-66.
47. An example of a change in accounting principles applied would be the adoption of the first-
in, first-out ("FIFO") method of valuing inventory in the current year where previous years used
the last-in, last-out ("LIFO") method was used. Id. AU § 508.61, at 667.
48. An example of a significant uncertainty would be material pending litigation which has not
been adequately disclosed. Id. AU § 508.55, at 666; Paschall, supra note 2, at 702.
49. In an adverse opinion, an explanatory paragraph must be included in the report which
should (I) describe the reason(s) for the issuance of the adverse opinion, (2) describe the effects
on the financial statements of the departure from GAAP, if determinable, and (3) expressly note
if the effects cannot be determined. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 508.68, at 668.
50. Id. AU §§ 508.67-.69, at 668-69; see also Hagen, Effect of Compliance. supra note 2, at
70-71 (describing when a CPA must issue an adverse opinion); Paschall, supra note 2, at 702-03
(stating that an adverse opinion must be issued when the credibility of the financial statement
presentation is destroyed). A situation warranting an adverse opinion is an entity's departure from
GAAP.
51. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 508.69, at 668-69.
52. When an auditor issues a disclaimer opinion, he should include at least one explanatory
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express an opinion on the financial statements. 3 A disclaimer opin-
ion is rendered when the accountant is unable to form an opinion
because of serious limitations on the scope of the examination of the
audit, 4 because the financial statements were unaudited, 55 or be-
cause the auditor was not independent with respect to the client.56
Because an unqualified opinion is the opinion particularly relevant
to the concern of accountant negligence liability, this Note focuses
on the assertions made in the unqualified opinion. 57
B. Assertions Made in the Unqualified Audit Opinion
Ordinarily, after completion of the audit, the auditor issues an
unqualified audit opinion 58  assuring the client that its financial
statements fairly represent its economic condition in conformity
with GAAP5 9 This opinion "serves as an assurance to the client
paragraph stating the reasons for the disclaimer. Id. AU § 508.71, at 669.
53. Id. AU § 508.70, at 669; see also Hagen, Effect of Compliance, supra note 2, at 71 (ex-
plaining that a CPA attempts to avoid responsibility for the financial statements by issuing a
disclaimer opinion); Paschall, supra note 2, at 703 (stating that a disclaimer opinion is issued
when it is not objectively possible for the auditor to determine whether the financial statements
are in conformity with GAAP).
54. A serious limitation on the scope of the audit would be, for example, a company's failure to
take a physical inventory. AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 18, AU §§ 508.70-.72, at 669-70.
55. An unaudited financial statement is one where GAAS have not been applied, and a lesser
function, such as a compilation, has been completed. Id. AU §§ 504.05-.06, at 602.
56. ALVIN A. ARENS & JAMES K. LOEBBECKE, AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 43-45
(3d ed. 1984) (illustrating when disclaimer opinions are appropriate); see also Hagen, Effect of
Compliance, supra note 2, at 72 (discussing situations which warrant the use of a disclaimer
opinion); Paschall, supra note 2, at 703 (stating that a disclaimer opinion is rendered when an
accountant cannot form an opinion because of serious limitations on the scope of the audit). For a
discussion of situations warranting a disclaimer opinion by the auditor, see AICPA STANDARDS,
supra note 18, AU §§ 504.09-.10, at 603.
57. This Note focuses solely on the unqualified opinion and its effects on accountant liability
because the unqualified opinion results in the greatest assurances by an accountant.
58. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing the unqualified opinion).
59. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1932. When the auditor states that "the financial statements...
present fairly ...the financial position of . . .[the company] . ..in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles," the auditor is assuring that the:
(a) Accounting principles selected by the client have general acceptance.
(b) Accounting principles are appropriate for the client.
(c) Disclosures, such as financial statement notes, are adequate to allow the user to
use, understand, and interpret the financial statements.
(d) Data presented in the financial statements are classified and summarized in a
reasonable manner.
(e) Underlying events and transactions, within a range of acceptable limits, are re-
flected in the financial statements.
(f) The financial statements have not been materially affected by changes in account-
ing principles.
MILLER & BAILEY, supra note 23, at 11.06.
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that its own perception of its financial health is valid and that its
accounting systems are reliable."' 0 Significantly, the audit report
aides the client in convincing third parties 6' that it is safe to extend
credit to or invest in the client.6 2 Such use by third parties forms the
basis for liability to third parties when the accountant acts
negligently."3
There are several ways that the audited financial statements may
result in a material misstatement of the financial position of a cli-
ent. 4 Financial statements can be materially misstated through
management fraud, clerical errors by the company, or the auditor's
negligence in conducting the audit.65 For example, through manage-
ment fraud the financial statements may be altered to disguise fi-
nancial problems when the company is in need of funds from credi-
tors or investors.66 Also, because audits are based on sampling, the
accountant may fail to detect fraud through normal auditing proce-
dures and thereby issue an unqualified opinion. 7 Even when audits
are conducted correctly, they cannot guarantee complete accuracy
or the discovery of fraud. 8 Audits are not insurance policies; even a
carefully conducted audit can result in misstated financial state-
ments. Such a situation, however, is not considered negligence.69 Al-
60. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1932. The audit report is not a "rubber stamp" for management.
Although the majority of opinions issued by auditors are unqualified, the audit fee is quite signifi-
cant for such an in-depth analysis of a company's records.
61. Third parties can include banks, lenders, suppliers, creditors, and investors. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. An unqualified opinion does not insure the absence of fraud. Hagen, Effect of Compli-
ance. supra note 2, at 69. The AICPA Standards recognize that although the auditor is not re-
quired to detect fraud, he is required to exercise proper care in conducting his audit:
The auditor should exercise (a) due care in planning, performing, and evaluating the
results of audit procedures, and (b) the proper degree of professional skepticism to
achieve reasonable assurance that material errors or irregularities will be detected.
Since the auditor's opinion on the financial statements is based on the concept of
reasonable assurance, the auditor is not an insurer and his report does not constitute a
guarantee. Therefore, the subsequent discovery that a material misstatement exists in
the financial statements does not, in and of itself, evidence inadequate planning, per-
formance, or judgment on the part of the auditor.
AICPA STANDARDS, supra note 18, AU § 316.08, at 245-2.
68. Lochner, supra note 17, at 108.
69. Thus, a CPA who carefully conducts his audit but inadvertently fails to uncover manage-
ment fraud or misstatements in the financial statements ordinarily will not be held liable for negli-
gence, even if a third party relied on the misstated financial statements to his detriment. A care-
fully conducted audit is the auditor's best defense.
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ternatively, a poorly conducted audit may fail to detect unintended
errors in the client's financial statements.70
No matter why the financial statements are misleading, the bot-
tom line is that a third party who relies on them may be harmed.
An example of this occurs when the auditor's client becomes insol-
vent.7 1 When someone is harmed, economically or otherwise, an is-
sue of legal liability can arise.
C. Accountant Negligence
Accountants have a duty to exercise the reasonable care, judg-
ment, honesty, and independence of a competent member of the pro-
fession in obtaining and communicating information. 72 The difficulty
of complying with this standard lies in determining what is reasona-
ble. 73 In an unqualified opinion, the auditor asserts that he has au-
dited the financial statements in accordance with GAAS; 74 thus,
failure to comply with GAAS can constitute negligence. 75 Ten
broadly phrased sets of standards and general principles that guide
the audit process are included in GAAS. 76 These standards are clas-
sified as general standards,77 standards of field work, 78 and stan-
70. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1932. An auditor who poorly conducts an audit can be considered
negligent.
71. Id.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 552 (1977); Paschall, supra note 2, at 704; see
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1984) (noting that an auditor is
ethically and professionally obligated to determine as far as possible whether the corporation's
contingent tax liabilities have been accurately stated); Dodd, supra note 12, at 913 (noting that
accountants must exercise the degree of care and skill "customarily employed by reasonably com-
petent members of their profession"); see also Gantt v. Boone, Wellford, Clark, Langschmidt &
Pemberton, 559 F. Supp 1219, 1228 (M.D. La. 1983) (holding accountants to the standard of a
prudent accountant practicing in the locality), affd, 742 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1984); Halla Nurs-
ery, Inc. v. Baumann-Furrie & Co., 454 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Minn. 1990) (holding accountants to
the standard of care of a person of average ability and skill engaged in the profession); Greenstein,
Logan & Co. v. Burgess Mktg., Inc., 744 S.W.2d 170, 185 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that
accountants must "exercise the degree of care, skill and competence that reasonably competent
members of their profession would exercise under similar circumstances").
73. Paschall, supra note 2, at 704.
74. Id.; MILLER & BAILEY, supra note 23, at 11.04-05.
75. Wiener, supra note 2, at 237.
76. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 150.02, at 81-82.
77. The "generally accepted auditing standards," as established by AICPA, are as follows:
1. The audit is to be performed by a person or persons having adequate technical
training and proficiency as an auditor. ...
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to
be maintained by the auditor or auditors. ...
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the audit and prepa-
ration of the report.
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dards of reporting.7 9 Although departure from GAAS does not con-
stitute per se negligence, 80 a direct showing that the auditor did not
perform the audit in accordance with these standards may indicate
negligence by the auditor. Likewise, the existence of a material mis-
statement in the financial statements creates the inference that the
auditor has not complied with GAAS and has thus breached his
professional duty. 1 An audit which is properly planned and con-
ducted is intended to ensure that the client's financial statements are
free from material misstatement. 2 Thus, the existence of such mis-
statement calls into question the auditor's planning and
performance.
Generally, a question of accountant liability develops when a
third party relies on negligently prepared financial statements and
loses money as a result.8 Such accountant negligence must be the
legal or proximate cause of the loss to the third party before that
Id. AU § 150.02, at 81.
78. The standards of field work provide that:
I. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to be properly
supervised ...
2. A sufficient understanding of the internal control structure is to be obtained to plan
the audit and to determine the nature, timing, and extent of tests to be
performed ...
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through inspection, obser-
vation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a reasonable basis for opinion regarding
the financial statements under audit.
Id.
79. The standards of reporting require that:
I. The report shall state whether the financial statements are presented in accordance
with generally accepted accounting principles ...
2. The report shall identify those circumstances in which such principles have not
been consistently observed in the current period in relation to the preceding
period. ...
3. Informative disclosure in the financial statements are to be regarded as reasonably
adequate unless otherwise stated in the report. ...
4. The report shall contain either an expression of opinion regarding the financial
statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect that an opinion cannot be
expressed. When an overall opinion cannot be expressed, the reasons therefor should
be stated. In all cases where an auditor's name is associated with financial statements,
the report should contain a clear-cut indication of the auditor's work, if any, and the
degree of responsibility the auditor is taking.
Id. AU § 150.02, at 81-82.
80. Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 744 F. Supp. 531, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
81. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU § 316.05, at 240. The auditor should design the
audit to provide reasonable assurance of detecting errors and irregularities that are material to the
financial statements. Id.
82. Id. AU § 316.08, at 240.
83. Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1933.
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party can hold the accountant liable. 4 It is important to note, how-
ever, that the business's subsequent failure does not by itself indi-
cate auditor negligence. 5 In fact, if the financial statements cor-
rectly reflect the financial condition and operations of a business,
and .these conditions have been properly considered by the auditor in
the audit report, subsequent business failure should not be
surprising."0
Historically, a business had its financial statements audited to in-
form its officers of any existing or potential financial and operational
problems." Today, however, the role of the audit has changed con-
siderably. Because of the growing need to acquire extensive funding
for business operations, the accountant's key role has expanded to
encompass an independent examination of the business's financial
statements and the issuance of a resulting opinion on the statements'
validity.88 Clearly, the "auditor's function has expanded from that
of a watchdog for management to an independent evaluator of the
adequacy and fairness of financial statements issued by the com-
pany's management to stockholders, creditors, and others."89
Additionally, the accountant is viewed by some as an independent
84. Paschall, supra note 2, at 706.
85. Dodd, supra note 12, at 919. One writer has noted that "[aluditors do not cause business
failures, nor can they prevent them from happening." Nancy Chaffee, Note, The Role and Re-
sponsibility of Accountants in Today's Society, 13 J. CORP. L. 863, 882 (1988).
86. Dodd, supra note 12, at 919.
87. Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 576.
88. Id. at 577.
89. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983); see also United States v.
Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 818 (1984) (stating that the independent accountant "owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the investing
public"); International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218,
224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (stating that the accountant must realize that an unqualified opinion
will be relied upon by investors, creditors, lenders, stockholders or anyone else involved in the
financial concerns of the audited entity).
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984), described
the role of the independent auditor:
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role. By certifying
the public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the indepen-
dent auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relation-
ship with the client. The independent public accountant performing this special func-
tion owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well
as to the investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the account-
ant maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete
fidelity to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's
interpretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance
of the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.
Id. at 817-18.
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guarantor of the accuracy and fairness of the business's financial
statements.9" This responsibility potentially imputes a duty on the
accountant to third parties.91 Once this duty is in place, liability can
result if the accountant breaches that duty.92 The role of the ac-
countant as a guarantor of financial statements for relying third
parties, however, is greatly disputed.93 The law fully recognizes that,
just as a doctor does not guarantee a patient complete recovery from
an injury or sickness nor does an attorney guarantee a client's suc-
cess in litigation, an accountant performing an audit does not guar-
antee the accuracy of the client's financial statements.9 Negligence
liability results only when the accountant fails to meet the standards
of the accounting profession. At the heart of this debate is the deter-
mination of whether and to what extent the accountant, if negligent,
should be held liable to a third party. 5
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY TO
THIRD PARTIES
Three different approaches have been developed to help answer
the question of whether auditors should be liable to third parties
who read and rely on audit reports.9 A substantial number of juris-
dictions follow the lead of Chief Judge Cardozo's 1931 opinion for
the New York Court of Appeals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co.97 Under this approach, a third party will be denied
relief for auditor negligence in the absence of a third party relation-
ship to the auditor that is "akin to privity."' 98 Most jurisdictions,
90. Some commentators believe that the auditor is basically an independent assessor of the
accuracy and fairness of the financial statements so that investors and creditors can be more fully
informed. E.g., Samuel H. Gruenbaum & Marc 1. Steinberg, Accountants' Liability and Respon-
sibility: Securities, Criminal and Common Law, 13 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 247, 249 (1980); Frank J.
Macchiarola, The Accountants' Liability Controversy, I COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 177, 179 (1988).
91. Gruenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 90, at 311-12.
92. Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 577.
93. Id. (describing how this perceived role is intensely contested among scholars and
commentators).
94. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
95. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 746 (Cal. 1992); see infra notes 217-81 and
accompanying text (discussing the Bily decision). Again, negligence can result when an auditor
poorly conducts his audit. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (reiterating this point).
96. Bily, 834 P.2d at 752; see also supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (listing the three
views).
97. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
98. See infra notes 101-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Ultramares doctrine).
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however, follow the view expressed in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, which generally imposes liability on suppliers of commercial
information to third persons who are intended beneficiaries of the
information. 9 A handful of jurisdictions follow a third view, which
allows recovery based on auditor negligence to third parties whose
reliance on the audit report was "reasonably foreseeable" by the au-
ditor.100 These three approaches will be discussed respectively.
A. The Ultramares Doctrine
Historically, under contract law, the accountant's duty was solely
to his client. 101 A person performing under a contract owed duties
and responsibilities only to the person with whom he had con-
tracted. 2 This relationship by contract provided the basis for
"privity.' 10 3
Still, there had not been a significant inquiry into the issue of
whether accountant liability for negligence extends to a third party
until 1931,10 when Judge Cardozo delivered the opinion in Ul-
tramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.105 In this seminal case, the
defendant accounting firm of Touche, Niven & Company
("Touche") was engaged to prepare a certified balance sheet for a
client, Fred Stern & Company ("Stern"). 06 Stern imported and
sold rubber, for which it was required to borrow extensively in order
to finance its business operations.' With the knowledge that the
certified balance sheet would likely be used by Stern to secure fi-
nancing, Touche completed the financial statement and supplied
Stern with thirty-two copies of the report.'0 8 Touche's certification
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see infra notes 139-70 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
100. E.g.. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983); see infra notes 171-216
(discussing the "reasonably foreseeable" approach).
101. Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 578. Support for this view is found in the fact that the
audit opinion is addressed to the company's management.
102. Id. at 578-79; Zoe Holmes, Comment, Accountant Liability to Third Parties: To What
Extent is Comparative Negligence a Defense?, 55 UMKC L. REv. 608, 615 (1987).
103. ARTHUR L. CORBIN. CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778 (1951). "Privity" is defined as "[t]hat
connection or relationship which exists between two or more contracting parties." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990).
104. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 443 (N.Y. 1931).
105. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
106. Id. at 442.
107. Id.
108. Id. Although Touche had knowledge that the financial statements would be used by Stern
to secure financing, they were not aware of the specific parties, such as Ultramares, with whom
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was attached to the financial statements which provided that "said
statement, in our opinion, presents a true and correct view of the
financial condition of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., as of December 31,
1923."109
Although the certified balance sheet reflected a healthy company,
Stern was, in fact, insolvent.1 ' The report contained material inac-
curacies because of fraud by Stern and the accountant's negligent
overvaluation of the company's assets. 11' The plaintiff, Ultramares,
loaned Stern large sums of money in reliance on the accountant's
certified statements;1 2 as a result, Ultramares sustained financial
losses when Stern suddenly declared bankruptcy." l3 Ultramares sub-
sequently brought an action against Touche seeking recovery under
theories of both fraud and negligence." 4
With respect to the fraud claim, Judge Cardozo found for U1-
tramares." 5 Judge Cardozo held that in a fraud claim, where the
accountant knowingly sought to deceive the injured parties, or
where the audit was conducted so carelessly that the accountant
could not honestly believe the validity of his own conclusions, a third
party can recover. 1 6
Judge Cardozo, however, disallowed recovery on negligence
grounds," 7 holding that recovery in negligence will be allowed only
when the third party and the accounting firm or CPA are in priv-
ity. 18 The court explained that "the ensuing liability for negligence
is one that is bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between
the parties by whom the contract has been made." 1 9 Thus, the
Stern sought financing. Id,
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Stern's management created fictitious and nonexistent accounts receivable which the
accountants negligently failed to substantiate; if properly analyzed, they would have revealed the
company's impecunious situation. Id. at 442-43.
112. Id. at 443. Loans were made on the condition that Ultramares would receive a balance
sheet certified by Touche stating Stern's financial condition. Id. In response, Stern provided UI-
tramares with the balance sheet certified by Touche. Based on the presentation on the balance
sheet that Stern was in good financial shape, Ultramares made loans to Stern. Id.
113. Id. When Stern declared bankruptcy, Ultramares sustained financial losses from the un-
collected loans because security on the loans was either nonexistent or inadequate. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 444; see also Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1935 (discussing the Utramares fraud
claim that allows third parties to recover).
117. Ultramares, 174 N.E. at 448.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 448.
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court held that the contractual requirement of privity is required for
a third party to recover when an accountant is negligent.
Judge Cardozo noted that if third parties were allowed to recover
from an accountant for negligence, "a thoughtless slip or blunder
... [would] expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. ' 120 The
court further reasoned that imposing such a duty was not necessary
to protect third parties, noting that it was doubtful "whether the
average business man [sic] receiving a certificate without paying for
it and receiving it merely as one among a multitude of possible in-
vestors, would look for anything more [than legal protection against
fraud]."12 In other words, third parties only expect an audit report
to be free from fraud. The notion that the accountant's product is
intended only for the benefit of his client 122 is clearly reflected in
Cardozo's statement that "public accountants are public only in the
sense that their services are offered to any one [sic] who chooses to
employ them."' 23
Subsequent interpretation of Ultramares has not required strict
privity of contract as a prerequisite to third party suits against audi-
tors. "'24 For example, in Credit Alliance v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 25 the New York Court of Appeals found an equivalent privity
relationship when the primary "end and aim" of the audit was for a
particular party and some "linking" conduct occurred, resulting in a
nexus between the two parties "sufficiently approaching privity."' 1 6
Although Credit Alliance, on the one hand, illustrates the continued
acceptance of the Ultramares privity doctrine, it also illustrates a
relaxation of the standard to one that "sufficiently approaches
120. Id. at 444.
121. Id. at 448; see Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1935-36 (doubting whether the implication of
such a duty was necessary to protect third parties).
122. Paschall, supra note 2, at 712-13; see Darrell D. Hallett & Thomas R. Collins, Comment,
Auditors' Responsibility for Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial
Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139, 178 (1968) (recognizing that the use of the accountant's
product is for informing management, and that any additional use by third parties is merely inci-
dental). See generally Fiflis, supra note 2, at 102-13 (discussing the need for privity between the
plaintiff and defendant in a suit for negligent misrepresentation).
123. Ultratnares, 174 N.E. at 448.
124. See Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985) (re-
laxing the strict Ultramares privity doctrine by requiring a relationship "sufficiently approaching
privity").
125. 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985).
126. Id. at 110.
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privity." '127
In Credit Alliance,128 the plaintiff loaned money to the auditor's
client in reliance on audited financial statements which overstated
the client's assets and net worth. 129 The plaintiff alleged that the
auditor knew the plaintiff was lending money to the client and that
the auditor had communicated directly with the plaintiff regarding
the audit reports.1 n0 The New York Court of Appeals promulgated
the following three-prong test for determining whether an account-
ant can be held liable for negligence to a third party who has detri-
mentally relied on inaccurate financial statements:
(1) the accountants must have been aware that the financial reports were to
be used for a particular purpose or purposes; (2) in the furtherance of which
a known party or parties was intended to rely; and (3) there must have been
some conduct on the part of the accountants linking them to that party or
parties, which evinces the accountants' understanding of that party or par-
ties' reliance.131
The court applied this new test, observing that the primary, if not
exclusive, "end and aim" of these audits was to satisfy the plaintiff
lender. 3 2 Moreover, the auditor's "direct communications and per-
sonal meetings [with the lender] resulted in a nexus between them
sufficiently approaching privity."13'  However, a mere unsolicited
phone call by a third party to the auditor is insufficient to demon-
strate the existence of a relationship between the third party and the
127. Id.; see also Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d
1080 (N.Y. 1992) (reaffirming the "sufficiently approaching privity" doctrine).
128. The court in Credit Alliance refused to overrule Ultramares, but it recognized the near
impossibility of having strict privity in an accountant-third party relationship. Credit Alliance,
483 N.E.2d at 110.
129. Id. at 112-13.
130. Id. at 113.
131. Id. at 118.
132. Id. at 120.
133. Id. More recently, the New York court was criticized for not offering a rationale for the
distinct "linking" element of its rule nor specifying what conduct was required to satisfy this
element. See Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 754 (Cal. 1992) (criticizing the Credit
Alliance holding). In Bily, the California Supreme Court further questioned whether "linking"
conduct should be necessary if the auditor knows his engagement is for the express purpose of
benefiting a specific, identifiable third party. In such cases, "linkage" is arguably achieved by the
auditor's conduct in undertaking and carrying out the engagement with knowledge of its specific
purpose and the ultimate use to be made of the audit report. Id. The "linking conduct" element
appears to require not only that the existence of the third party be known by the auditor, but also
that the auditor either directly convey the audit report to the third party or act in some specifi-
cally planned way to induce reliance on the report. Id. at 755. This type of conduct seems rare
and unlikely to occur.
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auditor sufficiently approaching privity;-34 the auditor must be
aware of a particular purpose for the audit engagement and must
act to further that purpose."3 5 This additional "linking" conduct,
however, is not required by the Restatement (Second) approach." 6
At least nine states continue to follow either Ultramares or the
reformulation of privity rules by the Credit Alliance court, both of
which restrict the liability of accountants to parties with whom they
have a contractual relationship "sufficiently approaching privity.' ' 7
Thus, for nearly forty years, the Ultramares privity doctrine domi-
nated judicial thinking regarding accountant liability for negligence
to third parties, until several courts began to reject Ultramares in
favor of the Restatement (Second) approach." 8
B. The Restatement (Second) of Torts Approach
The first case to reject altogether the privity rule under UI-
tramares and its progeny in favor of a more flexible standard of
accountant liability was Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin."3 9 Here, the
court held that the defendant accountant could be held liable to
"actually foreseen and limited classes of persons. ' 140 In Rusch Fac-
tors, a lending institution brought an action against the defendant
CPA to recover damages sustained as a result of a loan made to a
134. Security Pac. Business Credit,'lnc. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1085
(N.Y. 1992).
135. Id.
136. See infra notes 139-70 and accompanying text (defining the Restatement (Second)
approach).
137. In five states the privity or "sufficiently approaching privity" result has been reached by
decisions of their highest courts. See Colonial Bank of Ala. v. Ridley & Schweigert, 551 So. 2d
390 (Ala. 1989); Idaho Bank & Trust Co. v. First Bancorp of Idaho, 772 P.2d 720 (Idaho 1989);
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Kennedy & Coe, 441 N.W.2d 180 (Neb. 1989); Credit Alliance Corp. v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110 (N.Y. 1985); Landell v. Lybrand, 107 A. 783 (Pa.
1919). In four other states, the privity doctrine has been incorporated by statute. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-114-302 (Supp. 1990); 225 ILCS 450/30.1 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 1-402(b)
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-26-12 (Supp. 1990). Federal court decisions have interpreted the
laws of three additional states to follow this rule even though the highest courts of these states
have not expressly considered the question. See Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841 (7th Cir.
1991) (Indiana law); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979) (Delaware law); Ste-
phens Indus., Inc. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (Colorado law).
138. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1937) (citing Ultramares for the
principle that without privity, a third party cannot recover from a negligent accountant), cert.
denied, 302 U.S. 758 (1937); Canaveral Capital Corp. v. Bruce, 214 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1968)
(holding accountants not liable to nonprivy parties absent fraud or gross negligence).
139. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
140. Id. at 92-93.
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Rhode Island corporation. 14' The defendant negligently prepared fi-
nancial statements showing the corporation to be solvent and in
sound financial condition when, in fact, such was not the case.' 42
The accountant actually knew that the plaintiff would rely on his
representations in extending credit to the corporation.1 43 In reliance
on the financial statements, the plaintiff loaned the corporation a
large sum of money, 44 and when the corporation later filed for
bankruptcy and defaulted on its loan, the plaintiff lender suffered a
financial loss.' 4 5
The Rusch Factors court criticized the Ultramares rule as unfair
to the injured third party. 46 The court adhered to the position taken
by a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in support
of its argument that an accountant should be held liable for negli-
gent financial misrepresentations if such misrepresentations are re-
lied upon by "actually foreseen and limited classes of persons."'
' 47
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was adopted in 1977,
rejects Ultramares's restrictive privity doctrine in favor of extending
liability to members of a limited class of third parties whose reliance
upon the representation was actually foreseen by the accountant." 8
141. Id. at 86-87.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 91. The defendant CPA knew that the financial statements were prepared for the
purpose of influencing that specific lender's conduct. Id.
144. Id. at 86-87.
145. Id. at 87.
146. Id. at 90-92. The court in Rusch Factors made the following observations:
Why should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden of an
accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more easily distributed
and fairly spread by imposing it on the accounting profession, which can pass the cost
of insuring against the risk onto its customers, who can in turn pass the cost onto the
entire consuming public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the caution-
ary techniques of the accounting profession? For these reasons it appears to this
[clourt that the decision in Ultramares constitutes an unwarranted inroad upon the
principle that "[t]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."
Id. at 91 (citing Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
147. Id. at 91-93. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966)
was adopted verbatim in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). The Restatement (Second) includes the
following section, entitled "Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others":
(I) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to
exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
(2) [T~he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
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Under the Restatement (Second), a professional who supplies false
information to assist others is subject to liability for a failure to ex-
ercise reasonable care. 149 The drafters of the Restatement (Second)
developed a two-pronged test for addressing accountant negligence
issues: liability extends to any person, or members of a limited class
of persons, that the accountant intends or knows will use the finan-
cial information;' ° and the injured party must be in a class of per-
sons who used the financial statements for "substantially the same
purpose" as the bona fide client."" Both prongs of the test must be
met before an accountant's duty of care is extended to the third
parties. 15
The Restatement (Second) expands liability to include a larger
class of third parties than does the Ultramares privity doctrine, but
it also includes several limitations. 5 The Restatement (Second)
does not allow recovery in situations where a third party's reliance is
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit and guidance
he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient intends to supply it;
and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends the information to influ-
ence or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar transaction.
Id.
149. See Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 185-86 (explaining the Restatement
(Second) approach).
150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a) (1977). For a detailed discussion of the
Restatement (Second) test, see John W. Bagby & John C. Ruhnka, The Controversy Over Third
Party Rights: Toward More Predictable Parameters of Auditor Liability. 22 GA. L. REV. 149,
163 (1987); Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 185-86.
151. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(b) (1977).
152. See Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 584 (discussing the Restatement (Second)'s two-
pronged test). The Restatement (Second) position is an attempt at reconciling Judge Cardozo's
Ultramares and Glanzer v. Shepard opinions to define the extent of liability for negligent misrep-
resentations. CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS. JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 321 (1980). Car-
dozo distinguished the Ultramares case from an earlier decision, Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E.
275 (N.Y. 1922), in which a public weigher who had certified the weight of a shipment of beans
was held liable to the buyer for the price of the beans that the plaintiff had paid for but had not
received. Cardozo said:
The service rendered by the defendant in Glanzer v. Shepard was primarily for the
information of a third person, in effect, if not in name, a party to the contract, and
only incidentally for that of the formal promisee. In the case at hand [Ultramares],
the service [ils primarily for the benefit of the Stern Company [the promisee], a con-
venient instrumentality for use in the development of the business, and only inciden-
tally or collaterally for the use of those to whom Stern . . . might exhibit it
thereafter.
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 446 (N.Y. 1931). See generally Mess,
supra note 2, at 842-45 (discussing the opinions in Ultramares and Glanzer).
153. See Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 584 (discussing the limits of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) approach).
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foreseeable or reasonably foreseeable to the accountant, but is not
actually foreseen.154 For example, under the Restatement (Second)
approach, an accountant who is retained to conduct an audit and to
furnish an opinion for no particular purpose generally undertakes no
duty to third persons.1 55 In order for the Restatement (Second) to
apply, the accountant must be actually informed that an identified
third party or class of third parties will be using the financial state-
ments, even though the accountant generally "knows that the finan-
cial statements . . . are customarily used in a wide variety of finan-
cial transactions by the corporation and that they may be relied
upon by lenders, investors, stockholders, creditors [and] purchas-
ers."1 56 Additionally, the Restatement (Second) does not extend lia-
bility to third parties unless some accountant-client communications
exist concerning the intended use of the report.1 57
The Restatement (Second) position will allow recovery to an un-
identified third party as long as that third party was a member of an
identified class of persons whose reliance the accountant could actu-
ally foresee. 58 For example, the accountant may be held liable to a
154. R. James Gormley, The Foreseen, the Foreseeable, and Beyond - Accountants' Liability
to Nonclients, 34 DEF. L.J. 75, 77 (1985); Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 584. This requirement
that the accountant actually foresee the third party use is subjective. See infra note 170 and
accompanying text (discussing the disadvantage of basing the negligent accountant's liability on
the accountant's subjective mental state).
155. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 758 (Cal. 1992); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10 (1977).
156. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10 (1977). Such an auditor is not
informed
of any intended use of the financial statements; but ... knows that the financial
statements, accompanied by an auditor's opinion, are customarily used in a wide vari-
ety of financial transactions by the [client] corporation and that they may be relied
upon by lenders, investors, shareholders, creditors, purchasers and the like, in numer-
ous possible kinds of transactions. [The client corporation] uses the financial state-
ments and accompanying auditor's opinion to obtain a loan from [a particular] bank.
Because of [the auditor's] negligence, he issues an unqualifiedly favorable opinion
upon a balance sheet that materially misstates the financial position of [the corpora-
tion] and through reliance upon it [the bank] suffers pecuniary loss. . . .[The audi-
tor] is not liable to [the bank].
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 758 (Cal. 1992) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 10 (1977)); see also Larsen v. United Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 300
N.W.2d 281 (Iowa 1981) (holding that recovery was permitted by a nonprivy party who had
actually paid for the accountant's services, and who was specifically designated as the one for
whose benefit it was being prepared).
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(2)(a)-(b) (1977); see also Badische Corp. v.
Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987) (holding that an accountant will be liable if the accountant
was manifestly aware of the use to which the information was to be used and intended that it be
so used).
158. See Pace, Note, supra note 2, at 439-40 n.50 (delineating the "limited class" of third
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third party lender if the accountant is informed by the client that
the audit report will be used to obtain a loan, even if the specific
lender remains unidentified or the client names one lender and then
borrows from another.' 9 By contrast, the accountant is not liable to
other lenders when, for example, he agrees to conduct the audit with
the express understanding that the audit report will be given only to
a specified lender and is then given to other lenders. 160 Likewise, the
accountant is not liable when the client's transaction, as communi-
cated to the accountant, changes so as to materially increase the
audit risk. For example, an accountant is not liable to a third party
who originally considers selling goods to the client on credit but
later buys a controlling interest in the client's stock, both times act-
ing in reliance on the accountant's audit report.'
At least nineteen states have endorsed or favorably cited the Re-
statement (Second) rule recognizing an accountant's liability to an
actually foreseen third party.' For many courts, the Restatement
(Second) rule has been a satisfactory compromise between the tradi-
tional Ultramares privity approach 6 3 and the "specter of unlimited
liability" of the reasonably foreseeable approach. 6
parties that is allowed to recover). For cases which have followed the actually foreseen test for
liability, see Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank v. Swarty, Bresenoff, Yauner & Jacobs, 455
F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972); Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Ingram Indus.,
Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ky. 1981); Pahre v. Auditor of Iowa, 422 N.W.2d 178
(Iowa 1978); Westerhold v. Carroll, 419 S.W.2d 73 (Mo. 1967).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 6-7 (1977); see supra note 158
(citing cases illustrating accountant liability to limited classes of third parties).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5 (1977).
161. Id. cmt. j, illus. 14.
162. E.g., First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Monco Agency Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990)(Louisiana law); Ingram Indus., Inc. v. Nowicki, 527 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.Ky. 1981) (Kentucky
law); Bunge v. Eide, 372 F. Supp. 1058 (D.N.D. 1974) (North Dakota law); Rusch Factors, Inc.
v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (Rhode Island law); Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834
P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); First Fla. Bank N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990);
Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 356 S.E.2d 198 (Ga. 1987); Pahre v. Auditor of Iowa, 422 N.W.2d 178
(Iowa 1988); Stockier v. Rose, 436 N.W.2d 70 (Mich. 1990); Bonhiver v. Graff, 248 N.W.2d 291
(Minn. 1976); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
Thayer v. Hicks, 793 P.2d 784 (Mont. 1990); Spherex Inc. v. Alexander Grant & Co., 451 A.2d
1308 (N.H. 1982); Raritan River Steel Co. v. Cherry, Bekaert & Holland, 367 S.E.2d 609 (N.C.
1988); Haddon View Inv. Co. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 436 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1982); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 822 S.W.2d 592 (Tenn. 1991); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v.
James, 466 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971); Haberman v. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d
1032 (Wash. 1987); First Nat'l Bank v. Crawford, 386 S.E.2d 310 (W.Va. 1989).
163. See supra notes 101-38 and accompanying text (explaining the Ultramares privity
doctrine).
164. Briggs v. Sterner, 529 F. Supp. 1155, 1177 (S.D. Iowa 1981); see also First Nat'l Bank of
Commerce v. Monco Agency Inc., 911 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1990). In First National Bank. the
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Proponents of the Restatement (Second) approach argue that ex-
pressly limiting the class of third parties who can recover reduces
the risk of accountants' negligence liability and favorably promotes
the free flow of financial information throughout the business com-
munity. 16 5 Opponents, on the other hand, point out that since most
companies whose securities are publicly traded are obligated to file
certified financial statements with the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC"), 66 encouraging the free flow of information is
unnecessary.167
The Restatement (Second) rule inevitably results in some degree
of uncertainty.' 68 Commentators have criticized this view as arbi-
trary line-drawing, protecting only those who happen to be in the
"limited class" of actually foreseen third parties."6 9 Furthermore,
they note that basing the extent of the negligent accountant's liabil-
ity to third persons solely on the accountant's subjective mental
state completely disregards the accountant's fault.7 0
court, in holding that the Restatement (Second) view should apply in Louisiana, noted that there
are potentially competing interests when considering the issue of CPA liability for negligence to
third parties. The client is interested in having its financial picture presented in the best light
possible, within the bounds of GAAP. Id. at 1058. This view sometimes conflicts with the public's
demand for a straightforward and impartial evaluation of a company's financial performance. Id.
In light of these competing interests, the court concluded that the Restatement (Second) view was
the best solution, as it takes the middle ground between these two positions. Id. at 1061; see also
infra notes 171-216 and accompanying text (discussing the "reasonably foreseeable" approach).
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977) (noting that limiting liability
promotes the communication of financial information); see also Pace, Note, supra note 2, at 445
(noting that by "expressly limiting the class of compensable plaintiffs ... the free flow of finan-
cial information" is promoted). But see Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 200 (ar-
guing that the Restatement (Second)'s point that limiting liability encourages the free flow of
information seems unnecessary in today's world, where most companies whose securities are pub-
licly traded must file certified financial reports with the SEC).
166. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g)(1), 78q(a)-(e) (1988). Companies
whose securities are traded on a national securities exchange, and companies that have assets of
$1 million or more and that have equity securities held by at least 500 - but no more than 750
- persons must file an annual report containing certified financial information with the SEC. Id.
§ 781(g)(1).
167. Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 200.
168. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 759 (Cal. 1992) (discussing Dean William
Prosser's acknowledgment that the Restatement (Second)'s language is not entirely satisfactory).
169. See Kirby & Davies, supra note 2, at 592 (noting that the "lines established by the Re-
statement are vague"); Pace, Note, supra note 2, at 445-46 (recognizing that such a limitation
unnecessarily protects a "sophisticated accounting profession" from liability at the expense of the
less informed public).
170. Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 200. By focusing on what the accountant
subjectively knew, the Restatement (Second) disregards the fact that the accountant has been
negligent and that third parties have been harmed by his negligence. Id.
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C. The "Reasonably Foreseeable" Approach
Arguing that accountants should be held liable to third parties on
the same basis as other tortfeasors, Justice Howard Wiener advo-
cated a rejection of the Ultramares privity rule in a 1983 law review
article.171 Instead, he proposed a rule based on the foreseeability of
injury to third persons, concluding that:
Accountant liability based on foreseeable injury would serve the dual func-
tions of compensation for injury and deterrence of negligent conduct. More-
over, it is a just and rational judicial policy that the same criteria govern the
imposition of negligence liability, regardless of the context in which it arises.
The accountant, the investor, and the general public will in the long run
benefit when the liability of the certified public accountant for negligent
misrepresentation is measured by the foreseeability standard.'72
The first case to alter accountants' liability by extending the ac-
countant's duty of care to reasonably foreseeable third parties was
H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.'73 In Rosenblum, the accounting firm
of Touche Ross & Company ("Touche Ross") was engaged to audit
the financial statements of Giant Corporation." 4 Unbeknownst to
Touche Ross, Giant had falsely recorded assets that it did not own
and omitted substantial liabilities on its books.1 75 Touche Ross con-
ducted the audit and issued an unqualified opinion, but it failed to
uncover this large-scale management fraud.1 76 Rosenblum subse-
quently acquired the common stock of Giant in exchange for the
sale of its business to Giant, 177 but when Giant filed for bankruptcy,
Rosenblum's stock became worthless. 7 8 Rosenblum then sued, al-
leging that because the company's reliance on the financial state-
ments was reasonably foreseeable, the accounting firm had violated
171. Wiener, supra note 2, at 233.
172. Id. at 260.
173. 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983). The New Jersey Supreme Court in Rosenblum was influenced
in part by Justice Wiener's persuasive argument rejecting the privity rule of Ultramares in favor
of a "reasonably foreseeable" approach. Id. at 145. The court also expressed disfavor towards the
Restatement (Second) approach, stating that the Restatement (Second) was merely an extension
of Ultramares, with the added requirement that the auditor need not know the identity of the
beneficiaries if they belong to an identifiable group for whom the information was intended to be
furnished. Id.
174. Id. at 140.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 141. The opinion stated that "the financial statements 'present[ed] fairly' Giant's
financial position." Id.
177. Id. The plaintiffs, Harry and Barry Rosenblum, relied on the audited financial statements
issued by the accountants in acquiring Giant's common stock. Id.
178. Id.
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a duty of care by not discovering the fraudulent representations of
the client. 179
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Rosenblum found no reason to
treat accountants differently from other suppliers of products or ser-
vices to the public, and thus endorsed the idea of granting recovery
to third-party users of financial statements for economic loss result-
ing from negligent misrepresentation.180 The court held that an in-
dependent auditor, who furnishes an opinion without any limitation
as to whom the audited entity may disseminate the financial state-
ments, owes a duty to all reasonably foreseeable third parties who
rely on the statements pursuant to a proper business use. 18' Stock-
holders, potential investors, creditors, and potential creditors were
considered by the court to be reasonably foreseeable third parties.8 2
The Rosenblum court noted that the "auditor's function has ex-
panded from that of a watchdog for management to an independent
evaluator of the adequacy and fairness of financial statements issued
by management to stockholders, creditors, and others.' 8 3 From a
public policy standpoint, the court emphasized the potential deter-
rent effect of the expanded liability rule on the conduct and cost of
179. Id. The Rosenblums claimed that their reliance on the financial statements was reasonably
foreseeable to any auditor in general. Id. In other words, parties acquiring stock of another com-
pany often view the financial statements before making their investment.
180. Id. at 142-46. Under this view, a "defective" audit is conceptually similar to a defective
product which may injure consumers when injected into the stream of commerce. Id. at 152.
181. Id.; see also Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 202-03. Professor Hagen
explains that as a result of the Rosenblum court's requirement that the plaintiff prove he received
the audited financial statements from the company in accordance with a proper business purpose,
the scope of an accountant's duty of care will be significantly narrowed, since the circumstances
giving rise to an accountant's negligence claim to third parties will be restricted. Id. This require-
ment precludes some third parties with a foreseeable risk of injury - such as institutional inves-
tors and portfolio managers - from recovery because they did not acquire the audited financial
statements from the company. Id.
182. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152.
183. Id. at 149. The court analyzed the evolution of the function of an audit. Initially, the
primary function of an audit was to inform management of irregularities and inefficiencies in the
business; today, audited financial statements are made available for use by third parties. Id. "[lIt
is common knowledge that companies use audits for many proper business purposes, such as sub-
mission to banks and other lending institutions ...and to suppliers of services and goods that
might advance credit." Id. The court quoted an SEC decision rendered twenty-five years earlier,
stating that "the responsibility of a public accountant is not only to the client who pays his fee,
but also to investors, creditors, and others who may rely on the financial statements which he
certifies." Id. (citing In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670 (1957)).
In providing accounting statements which all concerned may accept as disinterested expressions,
based on technically sound auditing procedures and experienced judgment and expertise, the CPA
serves as a kind of arbiter or umpire among all the varied interests. Id. at 150; see supra note 89
and accompanying text (describing the role of the independent accountant in today's society).
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audits."' The court pointed out that by imposing a duty to foresee-
able users, accounting firms may engage in more thorough reviews
which, as the court noted, should in turn reduce the number of neg-
ligence claims against auditors.' 85 Additionally, in support of its
holding, the court noted the apparent ability of accounting firms to
obtain insurance against third party claims for negligent
misrepresentation.' 86
Two other state high courts, those of Wisconsin and Mississippi,
have also endorsed the reasonably foreseeable rule. 87 In Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co.,'88 the plaintiff bank extended
a loan to a company in reliance on audited financial statements
which were negligently prepared by its accountants.' 89 The Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court relied on the rationales of compensation, risk-
spreading, and deterrence in imposing liability on the accountants
for the foreseeable injuries resulting from their negligent acts.'9 0
The court explained that unless liability is imposed on the negligent
accountant to reasonably foreseeable third parties, third parties who
rely on the accuracy of financial statements will go unprotected and
accountant negligence will go undeterred.' 9' Without recovery, the
court cautioned that the cost of credit to the general public will in-
crease because creditors will either have to absorb the cost of bad
loans made in reliance on faulty financial statements, or hire inde-
pendent accountants to verify the information they receive.' 92 This
184. Rosenblum, 461 A.2d at 152.
185. Id. The court explained that firms may become more thorough by setting up stricter stan-
dards and applying closer supervision. Id.
186. Id. at 151. The court recognized that, at the time, accounting firms were able to obtain
insurance against third party claims under the federal securities laws, and thus posited that the
same or similar protection would be available in this instance. Id.
187. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987); Citizens
State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
188. 335 N.W.2d 361 (Wis. 1983).
189. Id. at 362. The accountants were negligent in failing to conduct the audit in accordance
with GAAS. Id. If the accountants had properly complied with GAAS, the court stated that
material errors in the financial statements would have been discovered and corrected. Id. at 363.
190. Id. at 365. The court further stated that "public policy" factors inherent in a particular
case may call for a limitation of liability. Id. at 366-67. These factors, which recognize that liabil-
ity should not be imposed even if negligence is found, include determinations of whether: (1) the
injury is too remote from the negligent act; (2) the injury is disproportionate to the culpability of
the negligent party; (3) in retrospect, it appears too improbable that the negligence was the cause
of the injury; (4) allowing the plaintiff to recover would unreasonably burden the negligent party;
(5) allowing recovery would result in an increased potential for fraudulent claims; or (6) allowing
recovery would create problems of indeterminate liability. Id. at 366.
191. Id. at 365.
192. Id.
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court also noted that accountants have the ability to spread the risk
through the use of liability insurance.19
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 94 the Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court continued the trend begun in Rosenblum.
Touche Ross, as an independent auditor for Fidelity Bank ("Fidel-
ity"), knew that Fidelity was insured against employee fraud with a
"Banker's Blanket Bond" issued by its carrier, United States Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Company ("USF&G"). 19 Touche Ross also knew
that USF&G could cancel its coverage with thirty days notice,
which in fact it did four months after the Fidelity audit was com-
pleted.' 96 In seeking other insurers, Fidelity showed insurers the au-
dited financial statements by Touche Ross.' 97 In reliance on the fi-
nancial statements - which, it turned out, had been negligently
prepared - Commercial Union extended coverage to Fidelity.'98
Under the facts of the case, Touche Ross would not have been
liable under the Ultramares privity doctrine 99 because they did not
know of Commercial Union's reliance, nor would they have been
liable under the Restatement (Second) approach200 since they did
not supply Fidelity with the audited financial information for the
benefit or guidance of Commercial Union.20' The court did not,
however, rely on either of these two views. Instead, the court applied
the reasonably foreseeable approach and found that Touche Ross
should have "reasonably foreseen that an entity such as Commercial
Union Insurance Company" might rely on the audit.20 2 The court
found that an independent auditor is liable to reasonably foreseeable
users of an audit report, 03 including those users who request and
receive a financial statement from the audited entity for a proper
193. Id.
194. 514 So. 2d 315 (Miss. 1987).
195. Id. at 321.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 323.
198. Id. at 316. Touche Ross was negligent in failing to disclose Fidelity's departure from
GAAP. Id.
199. Id. at 321; see supra notes 101-37 and accompanying text (discussing the Ultramares
privity doctrine).
200. Touche Ross, 514 So. 2d at 321-22; see supra notes 139-70 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
201. Touche Ross, 514 So. 2d at 321; see Paschall, supra note 2, at 721 (explaining that the
negligent accountant would have been free from liability under either the Ultramares privity rule
or the Restatement (Second) approach).
202. Tout-he Ross, 514 So. 2d at 323.
203. Id. at 322.
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business purpose. To recover, they must detrimentally rely on the
audit, suffering a loss which is proximately caused by the negligence
of the auditor."0 4
In addition to these three state supreme courts, the California
Court of Appeals also adopted the reasonably foreseeable doctrine
in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp.,2 °5 when it permitted recovery by a real estate developer who
had relied on negligently prepared financial statements in making
an agreement to purchase and sell government loans. 06 The court
rejected Ultramares for being inconsistent with state negligence law,
and emphasized the changing role of the independent accountant in
today's society.2 °0 The court explained that the risk of loss is more
appropriately placed on the accounting profession, as it is better
able to pass such risk to its customers and the consuming public.20 8
The International Mortgage court also found that society would be
better served by this rule because it provides a financial disincentive
for negligent conduct and heightens the profession's cautionary
techniques.20 9
An accountant's access to insurance is one of the primary ratio-
nales for the reasonably foreseeable approach;2 10 it is argued that
the availability of insurance alleviates the burden on accountants
when holding them liable.2 ' This premise is disputed by some
courts and commentators who claim that insurance merely causes
higher premiums to the accountant.212 Ultimately, the increased
204. Id. at 322-23. Although the court found the auditor's original negligence actionable, it
ended up reversing the jury's determination in favor of Commercial Union due to the occurrence
of an intervening cause; namely, criminal conduct by the bank's president. Id. at 323-24.
205. 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). International Mortgage was expressly overruled
by the California Supreme Court in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992); see
infra notes 217-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Bily decision).
206. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
207. Id. "We have determined the protectionist rule of privity announced in Ultramares is no
longer viable, for the role of the accountant in our modern society has changed." Id. at 226. For a
more detailed discussion, see Ann Simmons, Note, International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler
Accountancy Corp.: Third Party Liability - Accountants Beware. 18 PAc. L.J. 1055 (1986).
208. International Mortgage, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
209. Id.
210. H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 149 (N.J. 1983).
211. Edward Brodsky, Liabilities of Accountants. N.Y. L.J., Dec. 9, 1992, at 3, 14.
212. Id. Liability insurance premiums have increased 300 percent in the accounting profession
since 1985. Id. Additionally, the large accounting firms report an increase in premiums of 1000
percent, while the available coverage has been cut in half. Id. In an AICPA survey of accounting
firms, 40 percent of the surveyed firms indicated that they carried no insurance because of the
prohibitive costs involved. James H. Thompson, Professional Liability Insurance. Go Bare or
Not?. J. ACCT., July 1991, at I11.
[Vol. 43:859
ACCOUNTANT LIABILITY
cost of insurance and the cost of settlements or judgments are re-
flected in higher auditing bills which are passed on to the client.2 13
Regardless of this debate, the reasonably foreseeable standard
marks a significant departure from the restrictive view of Ul-
tramares21' and the middle ground of the Restatement (Second).215
It serves to expand the class of parties to whom accountants owe a
legal duty of reasonable care, a change in liability which represents
a trend toward making the accountant's duty commensurate with
his central role in today's business world.216
III. SUBJECT OPINION: BILY V. ARTHUR YOUNG & CO.
In 1986, the California Court of Appeals adopted the reasonably
foreseeable doctrine in the case of International Mortgage Co. v.
John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.21 7 Six years later, the California
Supreme Court overruled International Mortgage and adopted the
Restatement (Second) approach in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. 2 1 1
A. Factual Background and Procedure
The plaintiffs were investors219 in Osborne Computer Corpora-
tion, a company which manufactured the first portable personal
computer for the mass market.220 Shipments of the company's sole
213. Brodsky, supra note 211, at 15.
214. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931); see supra notes
101-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Ultramares privity doctrine).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see supra notes 139-70 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
216. See Paschall, supra note 2, at 721 (stating that accounting is no longer a profession in its
infancy but one that has flourished financially and has enjoyed the status and prestige often asso-
ciated with the legal and medical professions). One commentator notes:
[A] reexamination of the assumptions and basis for Ultramares reveals that the deci-
sion is no longer valid, and its result is that accountants today generally do not have
legal responsibility for their professional conduct to match their significant role in the
modern business community. The accounting profession is not a new and developing
profession in need of judicial protection, nor are the standards of the profession in
their formative years. . . . Finally, the use of financial reports by third parties who
are expected to rely on them is no longer a collateral matter to the preparation of the
report for the client.
Mess, supra note 2, at 855.
217. 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); see supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text
(discussing the International Mortgage case).
218. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
219. Id. at 747. The plaintiffs included individual investors as well as pension and venture capi-
tal investment funds. Id.
220. Id.
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product, the Osborne I computer, began in 1981; by the fall of
1982, sales had reached $10 million per month, making the com-
pany one of the fastest growing businesses in the history of Ameri-
can industry.22 a
In late 1982, the company began planning for an initial public
offering of its stock in early 1983. The company engaged three in-
vestment banking firms as underwriters for this venture, who sug-
gested that the company postpone the offering for several months.222
In need of financing to meet its capital requirements until the public
offering, the company issued warrants to investors in exchange for
direct loans or letters of credit to secure bank loans to the com-
pany.22 Several of the plaintiffs had purchased warrants from the
company, while others had purchased common stock of the company
during early 1983.224 One such investor, Robert Bily, who was also a
director of the company, purchased 37,500 shares of stock from
Adam Osborne, the company's founder, for $1.5 million.225
The company retained Arthur Young & Company226 to perform
audits and issue audit reports on its 1981 and 1982 financial state-
ments.227 Arthur Young issued an unqualified opinion228 on both the
1981 and 1982 financial statements.22 9 The 1981 financial state-
ments showed a net operating loss of about $1 million on sales of $6
221. Id.
222. Id. Postponement was suggested in part because of uncertainties caused by the company's
employment of a new chief executive officer and its plans to introduce a new computer to replace
the Osborne I. Id.
223. Id. The warrants entitled their holders to purchase blocks of the company's stock at
favorable prices that were expected to yield a large profit if and when the company's public offer-
ing took place. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. Arthur Young, at the time of the audits, was one of the "Big Eight" public accounting
firms. It has since merged with Ernst & Whinney to become Ernst & Young, now one of the "Big
Six" accounting firms. Id.
227. Id. As the company's auditor, Arthur Young's responsibility was to examine the annual
financial statements prepared by the company's internal accountants, examine the books and
records of the company, and issue an opinion on those financial statements. Id.
228. Recall that an unqualified opinion states that in the auditor's opinion, the financial state-
ments fairly represent the financial position of the company. See supra notes 39-41, 58-63 and
accompanying text (describing the unqualified opinion and the assurances that accompany it).
229. Bily,, 834 P.2d at 747. Each opinion was on Arthur Young's letterhead, was addressed to
the company, and stated in essence that: (I) Arthur Young had performed an examination of the
accompanying financial statements in accordance with GAAS; (2) the statements had been pre-
pared in accordance with GAAP; and (3) the statements "present[ed] fairly" the company's fi-
nancial position. Id.; see supra notes 18, 23, 39-41, 58-63 and accompanying text (explaining
GAAP, GAAS, and the unqualified opinion, respectively).
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million,2"' while the 1982 financial statements revealed a modest net
operating profit of $69,000 on sales of more than $68 million dol-
lars. 31 Arthur Young's audit report on the 1982 financial state-
ments was issued on February 11, 1983, and 100 sets of the opinion
were delivered to the company. 2
As the warrant transaction closed on April 8, 1983, the com-
pany's financial performance quickly began to falter,233 and sales
declined sharply.3 When the new Osborne "Executive" model
computer appeared on the market, sales of the Osborne I naturally
declined, but they were not being replaced by Executive units be-
cause they could not be produced fast enough due to manufacturing
problems.2 5 In June 1983, the IBM personal computer and IBM-
compatible software became major factors in the small computer
market, further damaging the company's sales.23 6 The public offer-
ing never materialized, and the company filed for bankruptcy in
September of 1983.237
The plaintiffs, having lost their investment, brought suit against
Arthur Young.2 3 a The plaintiffs testified that their investments were
made in reliance on Arthur Young's unqualified opinion on the com-
pany's 1982 financial statements, and alleged that the firm had neg-
ligently conducted the audit.2 3 9 In support of their position, the
plaintiffs raised three theories of recovery: fraud, negligent misrep-
resentation, and professional negligence.4
At trial, the plaintiffs offered an expert witness, William J.
Baedecker, who expressed the opinion that Arthur Young's perform-
ance amounted to gross negligence 4.2 1 He determined that Arthur
230. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 748. With respect to liability to third parties, the jury instructions on negligence
were given in accordance with International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp.,
223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). The jury was told that "an accountant owes a further
duty of care to those third parties who reasonably and foreseeably rely on an audited financial
statement prepared by the accountant. A failure to fulfill any such duty is negligence." Bily, 834
P.2d at 749; see supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text (discussing the International Mort-
gage case).
241. Bily, 834 P.2d at 748. Baedecker reviewed the 1982 audit and identified more than forty
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Young did not perform its examination in accordance with
GAAS.242 Further, he determined that Arthur Young had discov-
ered material weaknesses in the company's accounting controls but
had failed to report this knowledge to Osborne's management.243
At the trial court level, the jury exonerated Arthur Young with
respect to the fraud and negligent misrepresentation allegations, but
returned a verdict for the plaintiffs based on professional negli-
gence.244 The appellate court affirmed this judgment,24 5 but the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court reversed the negligence verdict.24 6 Signifi-
cantly, the California Supreme Court overruled the reasonably
foreseeable rule established in International Mortgage in favor of a
negligent misrepresentation rule in accordance with Section 552 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.247 A dissenting opinion argued
that the existing law should be preserved and that negligent ac-
countants should be held accountable for reasonably foreseeable in-
juries caused by the faulty performance of their professional duties
in auditing financial statements.248
B. The Bily Opinions
1. The Majority Decision
Writing the majority opinion for the California Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Malcolm Lucas separately analyzed the requirements
for liability under professional negligence and negligent misrepre-
sentation. 24 9 The majority differentiated between a cause of action
deficiencies in Arthur Young's performance. Id.
242. Id. Baedecker found the company's liabilities on the financial statements to have been
understated by approximately $3 million. As a result, the reported profit of $69,000 should have
been reported as a loss of more than $3 million. Id.
243. Id. Baedecker also charged that Arthur Young had actually discovered deviations from
GAAP, but failed to qualify its opinion and disclose these deviations in the audit report. Id.
244. Id. at 749. The jury awarded compensatory damages of approximately $4.3 million dol-
lars, representing approximately 75 percent of the total investment made by the plaintiffs. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 774.
247. Id. at 747.
248. Id. at 786 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 760. In addition to professional negligence and negligent misrepresentation, the
court discussed intentional misrepresentation (fraud). This Note, however, will only discuss the
negligence and negligent misrepresentation actions. In intentional misrepresentation, the auditor's
actual knowledge of the false character of its opinion is not required. Instead, if the accountant
has no belief in the truth of the statement and makes it recklessly, without knowing whether it is
true or false, the accountant has also made an intentional misrepresentation. Id. at 773.
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for pure negligence and one for negligent misrepresentation. °
a. Negligence
The majority held that the scope of an auditor's liability for gen-
eral negligence in conducting an audit of its client's financial state-
ments is confined to the client;251 other persons may not recover
under a pure negligence theory, but instead may recover under a
theory of negligent misrepresentation.252 The court based its holding
on three central concerns: (1) that the auditor who is exposed to
liability for negligence from all foreseeable third parties faces poten-
tial liability grossly disproportionate to his degree of fault;25 3 (2)
that the potential class of third parties in accountant liability claims
is generally sophisticated enough, able to conduct its own private
investigation, and has its own contracting power in making prudent
decisions;25 ' and (3) that the asserted advantages of accurate audit-
ing and efficient loss-spreading, as relied upon by advocates of the
foreseeability rule, are unlikely to occur.2 55
First, the court expressed concern that accountants would face
potential liability disproportionate to their fault. It explained that
mere foreseeability of harm by a third party is insufficient in rela-
tion to the possibility of multibillion-dollar professional liability,
which is out of proportion to the fault of the auditor and the connec-
tion between the auditor's conduct and the third party's injury. 56
250. Id. at 760; see infra note 287-88 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's argu-
ment that two such similar causes of action should not result in different outcomes depending on
which action is pled).
251. Bily, 834 P.2d at 767.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 761.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 761-64. As other courts and commentators have noted, such disproportionate liabil-
ity cannot be justified. See Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1944-45 (discussing disproportionate liabil-
ity as one of the reasons courts are reluctant to allow recovery); Gormley, supra note 154, at 77
(discussing the fact that the independent auditor does not control the client's accounting records
and processes, and concluding that a rule imposing liability on an accountant for reasonably fore-
seeable consequences of his negligence would be unfair). As one commentator has summarized:
The most persuasive basis for maintaining the limited duty [of auditors] is a propor-
tionality argument. . . .It can be argued as a general proposition in these cases that
the wrongdoing of an accountant is slight compared with that of the party who has
deceived him (his client) as well as the plaintiff. This rationale for nonliability is
similar to the proximate cause grounds on which willful intervening misconduct insu-
lates a "merely negligent" party from liability.
Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1513,
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Second, the court recognized that the potential class of third par-
ties who rely on such audits are more knowledgeable than ordinary
consumers. The Bily majority noted that while the maker of con-
sumer products has total control over the design and manufacture of
its product, the auditor simply expresses an opinion about the cli-
ent's financial statements, thus making the client essentially respon-
sible for the content of those statements."" The court further indi-
cated that third parties should be encouraged to rely on their own
prudence and contracting power. The court argued that such "self-
reliance" will promote sound investment decision-making.25
Finally, the asserted advantages of the reasonably foreseeable ap-
proach, according to the court, are unlikely to occur. Advocates of
the foreseeability rule explain that such a rule will be a deterrent,
leading to greater care and diligence in auditing, and that auditors
should bear the loss from negligently prepared financial state-
ments.25 9 The court, however, discounted this argument, citing a
lack of supporting empirical data, and predicted that detrimental
economic results are just as likely to occur.260 Thus, for the negli-
gence cause of action, the court adopted the Ultramares privity doc-
trine. The court next addressed the plaintiffs' negligent misrepresen-
tation claim. 211
1536-37 n.74 (1985).
257. Bily, 834 P.2d at 764. In discussing the prospect of private ordering, the court discounted
the analogy between the auditor's opinion and a consumer product, which advocates of the fore-
seeability doctrine use when arguing that the privity barrier is unwarranted. See e.g., H. Rosen-
blum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138 (N.J. 1983) (arguing that the demise of privity as a barrier to
recovery for negligence in products liability cases implies its irrelevance in the area of accountant
liability as well).
258. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765. The court noted that if third parties were allowed to recover, the
auditor, in effect, would become an insurer of not only the financial statements, but also of bad
loans and investments in general. Id.
259. See supra note 171-216 and accompanying text (describing the rationales for the reasona-
bly foreseeable approach).
260. Bily, 834 P.2d at 765-66. For example, accountants will reduce audit services in fledgling
industries where the failure rate is high, and costs of audits will increase, along with a decrease in
the availability of audits, with no corresponding improvement in overall audit quality. Id.; see also
Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Accounting. Some Economic Issues, 52 BROOK. L. REV.
1051, 1055 (1987) (discussing how increased accountant liability will create "defensive account-
ing" and increase client costs); Siliciano, supra note 2, at 1960-65 (discussing the incentive for
accountants to use evasive behavior rather than enhanced care in responding to increased liability
and the consequences associated with expanded liability).
261. The court determined that negligent misrepresentation was a separate and distinct tort
from the tort of negligence. Bily, 834 P.2d at 768. Negligent misrepresentation occurs "[w]here
the defendant makes false statements, honestly believing that they are true, but without reasona-
ble ground for such belief. ... Id.
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b. Negligent Misrepresentation
After analyzing the three approaches for allowing third parties to
recover from a negligent accountant, the court determined that the
Restatement (Second) approach was the most favorable.26 Thus,
the majority expressly overruled the reasonably foreseeable rule of
International Mortgage in favor of a negligent misrepresentation
rule in accordance with Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.263 The court reasoned that this was a more moderate ap-
proach to the potential consequences of imposing unlimited negli-
gence liability.26 The majority reasoned that the Restatement (Sec-
ond) rule is justified because: (1) it requires the accountant to
receive notice of potential third party claims; 6 5 which in turn (2)
establishes a closer connection between the accountant's negligent
act and the recipient's injury; 66 and (3) no unfairness results to the
recipient because he has means of private ordering, he can establish
direct communication with an auditor, and he can obtain a report
for his own direct use and benefit. 67
The court stated that requiring notice of potential third parties to
the accountant allows the accountant to discern the potential scope
of his liability and make rational decisions regarding the venture.
2 68
Identifying the limited class of plaintiffs as those to whom the ac-
countant himself has directed his activity establishes a closer con-
nection between the accountant's negligent act and the injury. This
alleviates the otherwise troublesome concerns of causation and of
credible proof of reliance. 26 9 Finally, the court concluded that no
unfairness to third parties results because they have the option of
private ordering. 70
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the majority's holding in effect gives neg-
ligent accountants broad immunity for their professional malprac-
262. Id. at 769.
263. Id. at 768; see supra notes 139-70 and accompanying text (describing the Restatement
(Second) approach).
264. Bily, 834 P.2d at 768-69.
265. Id. at 769.
266. Id.
267. Id.; see supra note 257 (discussing the lack of need for a privity requirement).
268. Bily, 834 P.2d at 769.
269. Id.
270. Id.; see supra note 257 (discussing the prospect of private ordering).
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tice in issuing unqualified audit opinions.271 Instead, the dissent en-
dorsed the rule that accountants owe a duty of care to all persons
who would reasonably and foreseeably rely on the accountant's pro-
fessional opinion.2"2 It also disagreed with the majority in its formu-
lation of two different rules for the general tort of negligence and
the factually-related theory of negligent misrepresentation.273
The proper determination of the scope of negligence liability, the
dissent argued, should begin with the principle that "an individual
who has acted negligently is liable for all reasonably foreseeable in-
juries caused by that negligence.1 27  Therefore, the dissent argued
that accountants are liable for all reasonably foreseeable injuries
caused by the negligent performance of their professional duties.17 5
The dissent explained that accountants should be liable for their
negligent acts unless public policy justifies a special limitation. 276 To
determine whether public policy justifies a limitation on the scope of
the duty owed in a particular context, the dissent recognized the
approach taken by many jurisdictions and recommended that the
courts should consider: (1) whether the harm to third parties is fore-
seeable; (2) whether economic injury to third persons is certain; (3)
whether the accountant's conduct is closely connected to the injury
suffered; (4) whether the moral blame is comparable to other ac-
tionable professional negligence; (5) whether the liability prevents
future harm; (6) the burden to accountants and the consequences to
the community of imposing liability; and (7) the availability, cost,
271. Bily, 834 P.2d at 774 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that the financial
statements audited by Arthur Young contained material errors that they would have discovered
had they used reasonable care in conformity with GAAS. As a result of Arthur Young's careless-
ness, a number of investors incurred tremendous losses when the corporation became insolvent. Id.
Had the auditors issued a qualified, adverse, or disclaimer opinion, the financial status of Osborne
would have been more accurately expressed, and the third parties likely would not have had a
cause of action against the auditors. See supra notes 36-56 and accompanying text (discussing the
different types of audit opinions).
272. Bily, 834 P.2d at 775 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Unlike the majority, the dissent would
have upheld the law of International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal.
Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
273. Bily, 834 P.2d at 775-76 (Kennard, J., dissenting). The majority allowed only the client to
recover in negligence, and allowed third parties to recover under the Restatement (Second) ap-
proach in negligent misrepresentation claims. As the dissent noted, with regard to the negligence
claim, the majority resurrected the "anachronistic privity barrier" in its strictest form. Id. at 783-
84 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
275. Id.
276. Id.
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and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.277 Applying these
factors to the facts of the case, the dissent determined that negligent
accountants should not be afforded more favorable treatment. The
dissent acknowledged that holding negligent accountants liable to
reasonably foreseeable third parties who detrimentally rely on faulty
audit reports will: (1) compensate innocent victims; (2) encourage
greater care in the performance of audits; (3) reinforce the indepen-
dence of accountants from their clients; and (4) avoid misallocation
of capital resources, all to the benefit of the accounting profession,
the relying third parties, and the public at large.278
The dissent also detailed its dislike for the Restatement (Second)
view as applied in support of the tort of negligent misrepresentation.
When applied to the audit opinions of independent accountants, the
Restatement rule imposes liability only when the negligent account-
ant has actual knowledge of the client's intended use of the audited
financial statements, but not when the intended use of the client -
although not specifically revealed - is plainly obvious to the ac-
countant by virtue of the client's financial situation and common
business practices. 279 The dissent felt it unreasonable to suggest, as
the majority did, that third parties can protect themselves by diver-
sifying their investment and loan portfolios and by obtaining their
own audits.280  This results in unwarranted protection for the
277. Id. These factors have been extensively relied upon by California courts, as well as other
jurisdictions, as a test for ascertaining whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. E.g.,
Horwarth v. Pfeifer, 443 P.2d 39, 42 (Alaska 1968); Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Califor-
nia, 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976); A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397, 401 (Fla.
1973); see also Wiener, supra note 2, at 244-45 (discussing the use of these factors by several
courts as a generally applicable test for determining liability in negligence).
278. Bily. 834 P.2d at 783 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 784 (Kennard, J., dissenting). As the dissent pointed out, the arbitrariness of this
distinction has been justly condemned. Id. The effect of the Restatement (Second) is to reward
ignorance and to penalize knowledge. As the dissent stated, to avoid liability, the accountant need
only agree with the client to remain unaware of the report's intended distribution and future uses.
Id.
Some commentators believe that there is no reason for preferring an actually foreseen third-
party user over a reasonably foreseeable one. Mark D. Boveri & Brent E. Marshall, Note, The
Enlarging Scope of Auditors' Liability to Relying Third Parties, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 281,
287 (1983). Neither party pays for the audit, and thus neither party is owed a greater duty of
care from the accountant. Id. Since today's accountants fully expect third parties to rely on their
opinions, the distinction is simply unjustified. Id.; see also Blue Bell v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 715 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that allowing liability to turn on the
fortuitous occurrence of the client specifically mentioning the person or class of persons to receive
a report, when the accountant probably has that same knowledge as a matter of business practice,
is too tenuous a distinction to be adopted as a rule of law).
280. Bily, 834 P.2d at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In response to these claims, the dissent
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"wealthy and financially savvy" at the expense of the innocent lend-
ers and investors, "whose only faults are their modest means and
their willingness to place their trust in independent audit
reports."'"
IV. ANALYSIS
The Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.2"' court had three options: it
could have reverted to the Ultramares privity doctrine, taken a short
trip back to the Restatement (Second) approach, or affirmed the
"reasonably foreseeable" approach of International Mortgage. Un-
fortunately, the Bily court chose the middle ground, the Restate-
ment (Second) approach. 2 3 The court made this short trip back-
wards, and as a result has left many injured third parties
uncompensated and without recourse.
It is the position of this Note that the best option would have
been to affirm the reasonably foreseeable approach. In analyzing the
Bily court's options, each approach will be discussed for the purpose
of demonstrating that the reasonably foreseeable approach is, in
fact, the best option. The analysis of accountant negligence begins
with the question of duty: whether accountants owe a duty to rea-
sonably foreseeable third parties. In essence it is a question of fair-
ness, and involves the weighing of public policy factors. Upon a
weighing of these factors, it will become clear that public interest is
best served by imposing a duty of care on accountants to reasonably
foreseeable users of financial statements.
The Bily majority denied recovery to a third party from a negli-
gent accountant. 84 Under the professional negligence theory, the
court held that an accountant owes no general duty of care for the
noted several problems. First, it is based on the principle of caveat emptor ("buyer beware"),
which conflicts with the moral and ethical responsibility of CPAs to exercise due care to avoid
harm to foreseeable users. Id. Second, it ignores the general principle that the risk of loss should
be placed on the negligent party who is best able to prevent such conduct. Id. Finally, it affords
the least protection to the parties who need it most. Id. The majority's private ordering argument,
that investors can conduct their own audits or obtain a separate opinion as to the status of a given
client, would cause a wasteful duplication of effort and expense, resulting in the delay and disrup-
tion of business activity together with higher costs for each transaction, thus leading to higher
interest charges and demands for higher investment returns. Id.
281. Id.
282. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see supra notes 139-70 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
284. Bily, 834 P.2d at 747.
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conduct of an audit to persons other than his client.285 Thus, under a
professional negligence theory, the third party has no cause of ac-
tion. Alternatively, the court held that under the theory of negligent
misrepresentation a third party can recover under the Restatement
(Second) approach.28 But as the dissent pointed out, these two fac-
tually similar tort theories do not warrant such drastic differences in
application;2 87 rather, the same standard should govern when apply-
ing either theory.2 88
A. The Ultramares Approach
The Bily court was correct in rejecting the option of applying the
Ultramares privity doctrine, as this doctrine is no longer appropriate
in today's financial environment. Historically, third party liability
was not even a concern because auditors owed sole responsibility to
the owner or management of a business;289 any use by a third party
was merely incidental.2 90 The Ultramares privity doctrine was the
logical limit for accountant liability in negligence. The rarity of
third party use justified requiring the third party and the accountant
to be in privity before liability would extend to the third party.
This justification lost its validity over time as auditors were called
upon more and more to provide lenders and investors with indepen-
dent opinions on the preparation of a company's financial state-
ments.29' Today, the audit report is largely for the benefit of third
party users, 29 and since the Ultramares privity doctrine has failed
to keep up with the evolution of the auditor's function, it therefore is
no longer workable given the reality that accountants now provide
audit reports largely for the benefit of third parties. Having shown
that Ultramares is not truly an option, the next approach to con-
sider is the Restatement (Second) approach.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 775-76 (Kennard, J., dissenting). As the dissent correctly observed, under both lia-
bility theories - general negligence and negligent misrepresentation - essentially the same stan-
dard of care is applied to the same conduct by the accountant. Id. Thus, it seems anomalous that
the class of persons the accountant owes a duty differs depending on which legal theory is raised.
Id. at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
288. Id.
289. Wiener, supra note 2, at 249-50.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 250. The SEC recognizes that dependable financial information is essential for in-
formed business decisions. Id.
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B. The Restatement (Second) Approach
The majority opinion in Bily adopted the Restatement (Second)
approach in holding accountants liable to actually foreseeable third
parties and limited classes of foreseeable parties.293 Although the
Restatement (Second) provides an improvement over the restrictive
Ultramares privity standard, as it parallels the evolution of the au-
ditor's function, it still remains unnecessarily limited.
The Restatement (Second) advances several rationales in support
of its actually foreseen or specifically foreseeable standard. For ex-
ample, the user of commercial information cannot expect that a
duty be extended to him when the supplier is unaware of the terms
of the third-party obligation. Second, these limitations are imposed
to promote the free "flow of commercial information upon which
our economy rests. 2 94
These rationales ignore reality. Auditors know that individuals
throughout the business world rely on audited financial informa-
tion,2 95 and the Restatement (Second), by requiring the accountant's
subjective knowledge of any third parties, results in arbitrary out-
comes. For example, an auditor will escape liability where he knows
a specific lender ("Bank X") will only use the audit report to lend to
the client, but where in reality a different lender ("Bank Y") lends
the funds to the client.2 96 The auditor knew that the report was go-
ing to be used for lending purposes, but because a lender other than
the one specified was used, the auditor dodges liability. Another ex-
ample of how the Restatement (Second) rule allows the auditor to
avoid liability for negligence occurs where the auditor knows the
specific third party is considering selling goods to the client on credit
in reliance on the audit, but instead the third party decides to buy a
controlling interest in the client, also in reliance on the audit.29
While the first transaction is actually foreseeable, the second is not.
Clearly, such arbitrary results are troubling.
293. Recall that the Restatement (Second) approach requires the auditor to have specific
knowledge of the third-party user, or the limited class of third parties for whom the client intends
as users of the audit report. See supra notes 139-70 and accompanying text (discussing the Re-
statement (Second) approach).
294. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977).
295. Frank, Comment, supra note 2, at 317; see also H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d
138 (N.J. 1983) (noting that the auditors "could reasonably expect that their client would dis-
tribute the [audited] statements in furtherance of matters relating to business").
296. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h, illus. 5 (1977).
297. Id. cmt. j, illus. 14.
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Additionally, the argument in favor of the free flow of informa-
tion is not safe from criticism. The free flow of information is not
impeded by allowing recovery to reasonably foreseeable users of the
financial statements; in fact, because of risk-spreading, the dissemi-
nated information is more reliable and can be continually improved
to avoid any potential liability.2 98 Further, the justification of pro-
moting the free flow of information is unnecessary in a world where
such information is required of most companies whose securities are
traded publicly and who must file certified financial reports with the
SEC.299
The majority opinion in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.300 advanced
three central concerns in its rejection of the reasonably foreseeable
approach: (1) the accountant will face potential liability vastly dis-
proportionate to its fault; (2) the class of reasonably foreseeable
plaintiffs are knowledgeable and can obtain their own assurances
through private ordering; and (3) the asserted advantages of deter-
rence and efficient loss-spreading are unlikely to occur.3"'
These justifications are also not safe from criticism. Like the ma-
jority, critics of the reasonably foreseeable standard are concerned
about indeterminate liability. 02 However, accountants can avoid
this fear of indeterminate liability by using disclaimers in their re-
ports of financial statements.30 3 Additionally, accountants can limit
their liability through agreements with the client calling for re-
stricted distribution of the audit reports.3 04 Furthermore, account-
ants can obtain insurance to curb the potential costs of liability.30 5
Even if the availability of insurance is in question, it should only be
a peripheral issue in determining tort liability in general. Courts
have pointedly disregarded the insurance issue in other areas of en-
terprise liability,306 and it should similarly be disregarded when de-
298. Frank, Comment, supra note 2, at 318.
299. See Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 200 (elaborating on the weaknesses of
the Restatement's justifications).
300. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
301. Id. at 761.
302. Garrison, supra note 2, at 210.
303. Id. A disclaimer opinion would state how the audit did not meet proper auditing standards
and the grounds for that failure. Id.
304. Paschall, supra note 2, at 726-29. Such disclaimers give fair notice to all potential users
and prevent third parties from reasonably relying on such information. Bily, 834 P.2d at 785
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
305. Garrison, Note, supra note 2, at 2.11.
306. Id.
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termining the extent of an accountant's liability to third parties.307
The Bily majority also claimed that third parties in such instances
are adequately knowledgeable, able to diversify their investments,
and can obtain their own assurances of a company's financial state-
ments." 8 As the dissent pointed out, there are several problems with
this argument. First, it is based on the principle of caveat emptor
("buyer beware"), which in this context conflicts with the ethical
and moral responsibility of accountants to exercise due care to avoid
harm to foreseeable users.30 9 Second, it ignores the general principle
that a risk of loss should be placed on the party who is best able to
prevent its occurrence. 10 Finally, it affords the least protection to
those who are most in need of it.3"1 Requiring each investor and
lender to obtain separate audit reports essentially results in wasteful
duplication of expense and effort.3 12 The majority's rule protects the
"financially savvy" at the expense of innocent lenders and
investors. 13
Finally, the majority claimed that the asserted advantages of de-
terrence and efficient loss-spreading are unlikely to occur. The ma-
jority argued that because there was no empirical data to show that
the reasonably foreseeable approach has had positive effects on ac-
countants' negligence actions, it is unworkable.3 14 This rationale,
however, is without merit. Even if this were true, the remedy should
come from legislation and not from the reduction of a legal duty by
the courts.31 ' It is a generally accepted principle that tort liability is
itself socially beneficial to the extent that it provides both an incen-
tive for due care, thereby preventing avoidable injuries, and com-
pensation for those who have been injured.31 6
307. Wiener, supra note 2, at 257. It is similarly recognized that the standard of reasonably
foreseeable third party recovery will result in increased litigation and expense. There is no logic to
relieving accountants of liability on such a basis, illustrated by the fact that the courts have failed
to make such a trade-off in other areas of negligence law. Id.
308. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 764-65 (Cal. 1992).
309. Id. at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
310. Id.
311. Id. Diversification would be easy for large institutional investors and lenders, but difficult
or even impossible for smaller lenders and investors. ld.; see also Frank, Comment, supra note 2,
at 317 (stating that the smaller investors - the ones most in need of protection - are ultimately
left unprotected).
312. Bily, 834 P.2d at 785 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 765.
315. Id. at 775 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
316. Id.
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The Restatement (Second) approach remains arbitrarily limited
in its application. It is overprotective of the negligent accountant
when the public is better served by allowing reasonably foreseeable
third parties to recover. Because the Restatement (Second) is based
on a subjective inquiry317 into the accountant's knowledge, it re-
wards ignorance and penalizes knowledge. To avoid liability, the ac-
countant only need agree with the client to remain "blissfully una-
ware" of the intended purpose of the audit report.318  The
Restatement (Second) approach is neither consistent in its applica-
tion nor comforting in its results.
C. The Reasonably Foreseeable Approach
It is a basic principle of tort law that an analysis of tort liability
should begin with the rule that an individual who has acted negli-
gently is liable for all reasonably foreseeable injuries caused by that
negligence. 31 9 Any exception to or limitation of this rule should be
made only if public policy demands it.3"' Courts look at numerous
factors to determine whether public policy justifies a limitation on
the scope of the duty, including: (1) the foreseeability of harm to
the plaintiff; (2) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury; (3) the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered; (4) the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct; (5) the policy of preventing future harm; (6)
the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with a resulting lia-
bility for breach; and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of
insurance for the risk involved.321
In applying the seven factors, as the dissent did in Bily, it is clear
317. Recall that the Restatement (Second) approach only allows recovery for those third parties
who are actually foreseen by the accountant. See supra notes 139-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
318. Bily, 834 P.2d at 784 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see Boveri & Marshall, Note, supra note
279, at 287 ("[A] clever accountant could circumvent the Restatement provision by asking his
client not to reveal the intended users of the statements.").
319. Bily, 834 P.2d at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
320. In essence, courts should begin with the duty-risk analysis enunciated in Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), and only if public policy suggests otherwise should a
limit be placed on a duty. See Wiener, supra note 2, at 254 (stating that in a negligence situation,
the presumption of liability is dispensed when required by public policy).
321. Bily. 834 P.2d at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d
561, 564 (Cal. 1968)); see supra note 277 and accompanying text (explaining that several juris-
dictions, deciding various areas of negligence law, have employed these factors to determine
whether a defendant owes a duty to a particular plaintiff).
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that public policy is best served by imposing a duty on accountants
to exercise due care with respect to reasonably foreseeable users of
their audit reports. First, harm to third persons is foreseeable, as it
is generally known and accepted that most corporate businesses ob-
tain audit reports to establish their own financial credibility in order
to influence third parties. 22 Because the normal and common uses
of audit reports are well known to accountants, an accountant can
readily foresee that negligence in the conduct of the audit will result
in harm to parties that receive and rely on the report in their deal-
ings with the client. 2
Second, economic injury to third persons is ascertainable. Unlike
emotional distress, economic injury can be demonstrated through
quantifiable losses. 2 " Although courts have expressed concern in
tort claim cases that injury could easily be falsified, this concern
arises primarily when the only injury claimed is emotional
distress3 2 5
Third, an accountant's conduct is closely connected to the injury
suffered, as an accountant prepares financial reports with the knowl-
edge that third parties will rely on the information supplied. To re-
cover for negligence, the plaintiff must prove reliance on the audit
opinion and a factual nexus between the plaintiff's loss and the fact
that the financial statements misrepresented or concealed informa-
tion. 26 It is important to show reliance by a third party, and that
such reliance was reasonable.327
Fourth, moral blame is comparable to other areas of actionable
professional negligence. Accountant negligence liability only results
when the accountant has failed to meet the standards of the ac-
counting profession; an accountant is liable in negligence only upon
proof of a failure to perform a reasonably careful audit in accor-
322. Bily, 834 P.2d at 776 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
323. Id. at 777 (Kennard, J., dissenting). In today's society, the role of the accountant is to
serve the public function. See supra notes 13-95 and accompanying text (discussing the role and
responsibilities of accountants).
324. Bily. 834 P.2d at 777 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
325. E.g., Burgess v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 1197, 1205 (Cal. 1992) (holding that in a case
of medical malpractice, the plaintiff could be compensated for emotional distress without suffering
physical injuries); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 821 (Cal. 1980) (holding that
physical injury is not required to sustain a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
326. Bily, 834 P.2d at 777 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
327. Drabkin v. Alexander Grant & Co., 905 F.2d 453, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (denying recov-
ery where no reliance was shown), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 999 (1990). An auditor can rebut a
claim of reliance by showing that a reasonable investor or lender in a similar circumstance would
not have relied on such information. Bily, 834 P.2d at 778 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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dance with GAAS. 28 Thus, when such a breach of due care has
been proven, the accountant's conduct is morally blameworthy to
the same extent as other forms of professional malpractice for which
negligence liability is routinely imposed.329
Accountants themselves admit their obligation to third party
users of audit opinions:
A distinguishing mark of a profession is acceptance of its responsibility to
the public. The accounting profession's public consists of clients, credit
grantors, governments, employers, investors, the business and financial com-
munity, and others who rely on the objectivity and integrity of certified pub-
lic accountants to maintain the orderly functioning of commerce. This reli-
ance imposes a public interest responsibility on certified public
accountants.sao
Because an accountant's moral, ethical, and professional responsibil-
ities extend to reasonably foreseeable third party users of audit
opinions such as lenders and investors, an accountant whose negli-
gent conduct causes economic loss to a foreseeable user is as equally
at fault as an attorney who negligently drafts a contract. In both
instances, the breach of professional responsibility through lack of
due care should result in liability to those to whom the professional
owes a duty of care.
Fifth, imposing liability under the reasonably foreseeable ap-
proach does prevent future harm to third parties because it deters
negligent conduct. Negligent auditing will be deterred because ac-
countants, realizing that their negligence toward third party users
will involve potentially great financial consequences, will use even
greater care to avoid such negligence. 331 Accountants are strongly
motivated to satisfy their clients, as it is the client who pays the
accountant. The accountant is thus caught between pleasing his cli-
ent and his moral and ethical obligation to maintain high standards
of care. The reasonably foreseeable approach resolves this conflict
328. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement that an audit
must be conducted in accordance with GAAS).
329. Bily, 834 P.2d at 778-80 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
330. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, ET § 53.01, at 4301.
331. Bily. 834 P.2d at 780-82 (Kennard, J., dissenting); Paschall, supra note 2, at 729; see also
International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 227 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (noting that liability "provides a financial disincentive for negligent conduct and
will heighten the profession's cautionary techniques"); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d
138, 152 (N.J. 1983) (noting that liability will "cause accounting firms to engage in more thor-
ough reviews," which will in turn "reduce the number of instances in which liability [will] en-
sue"); Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 335 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Wis. 1983) ("Unless
an accountant can be held liable to a relying third party, this negligence will go undeterred.").
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by promoting more careful auditing.
The sixth factor, the burden to accountants and the consequences
to the community of imposing liability on accountants, presents a
difficult issue. As the Bily dissent notes, federal securities laws re-
quire even stricter standards for accountants;"' an accountant who
has certified any part of a registration statement containing an un-
true statement of material fact is liable to any purchaser of the reg-
istered security. 333 The continued acceptance of the federal securi-
ties law, and the rules in those states following the reasonably
foreseeable standard, illustrates that a rule of liability to foreseeable
users of audit opinions does not result in burdens which destroy the
accounting profession or bring about consequences harmful to the
public welfare. If it is demonstrated that the burden of the reasona-
bly foreseeable liability rule is excessive, the solution would not be
the arbitrary reduction of the accountant's duty, as the court did in
Bily, but would rather be the creation of a cap on liability. This
could be done by limiting the accountant's maximum exposure for
negligence to a fixed percentage of the audited company's net worth.
Additionally, the auditor's opinion could be backed by a surety
bond. Either of these possible approaches would make the account-
ant's liability exposure less indeterminate. A decision of this sort is
best left for the legislature, and thus the court should not have cur-
tailed the accountant's duty.
Finally, insurance is available for accountants to protect them-
selves against large losses. As stated above, even if the availability
of insurance is in question, this should only be a peripheral issue in
determining tort liability,334 not a factor in determining the extent
of an accountant's liability to third parties. Because the cost of in-
surance premiums has increased dramatically since 1985," a1 and be-
cause numerous accounting firms have chosen not to carry insur-
ance, there have been numerous calls for liability reform. 3 6 The six
largest public accounting firms, in speaking for the accounting pro-
fession, advocated the imposition of a proportionate liability stan-
332. Bily, 834 P.2d at 783 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
333. Id. at 782-83 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
334. See supra notes 305-07 and accompanying text (discussing accountant liability insurance).
335. See Brodsky, supra note 211, at 14 (noting that liability insurance premiums have in-
creased 300 percent since 1985).
336. See ARTHUR ANDERSEN & CO. ET AL.. THE LIABILITY CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES:
IMPACT ON THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION. A STATEMENT OF POSITION (1992) (advocating liabil-
ity reform for the accounting profession).
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dard that assesses damages against each defendant based on that
defendant's degree of fault.3 a Still, if liability reform is necessary, it
must come from the legislative process. 3 8
Given the problems regarding insurance for the accounting pro-
fession,339 there are internal methods available for accountants to
limit litigation through risk management. 4 These methods include
stressing quality control within the firm by hiring qualified person-
nel, submitting their work to regular peer review, 341 and participat-
ing in continuing education courses. 42 Other risk management tech-
niques include educating the public and clients about the nature of
audit services, regular use of engagement letters, and maintenance
of well-documented working papers that are routinely reviewed by
management. 343 Further, accounting firms should attempt to reduce
the risk of liability by adequately screening potential clients.
The reasonably foreseeable approach will not result in unlimited
liability. At worst, it will weed out those unwilling to accept their
role and responsibility to the public; at best, accountants will be
more diligent in their conduct, thus adding greater credibility to the
profession and instilling needed confidence in the public. Because
the standards of the accounting profession require the exercise if
"due professional care,' 34 4 without limiting to whom this due care is
owed, the reasonably foreseeable standard would best further com-
pliance with the standards of the accounting profession. 345 The rea-
sonably foreseeable test most accurately reflects the actual use of
the audit reports in today's business world, and for this reason it is
the best method for determining an accountant's negligence liability
to third parties.
337. Id. at 6.
338. Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Defining the Limits of Accountants' Liability, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 15, 1992, at 5, 37.
339. See supra notes 305-07, 335-38 and accompanying text (discussing the insurance
problems for the accounting industry).
340. Thompson, supra note 212, at 112.
341. Recently, the AICPA has required member firms to undergo peer reviews. Id.
342. Id. Many state CPA societies require a CPA to pursue continuing education courses in
order to remain licensed to practice in the state. Id.
343. Id.
344. AICPA STANDARDS. supra note 18, AU §150.02, at 81.
345. Hagen, Accountants' Liability, supra note 2, at 208.
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V. IMPACT
The majority decision in Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.346 will have
an adverse effect on third party users who act in reliance on audit
reports as well as the general public. This rule continues to protect
the wealthy at the expense of those less knowledgeable who put
their faith in the accounting profession by relying on audited finan-
cial statements. California is often regarded as a frontrunner in va-
rious areas of the law. Consequently, states who may have been con-
sidering adoption of the reasonably foreseeable approach may
instead follow the holding in Bily and adopt the unfavorable, more
restrictive Restatement (Second) approach.
The Restatement (Second)3 47 view fails to encourage due care by
accountants. Accountants, knowing that they are less susceptible to
liability, may fail to engage in the level of care required by the in-
dustry,348 resulting in inaccurate financial statements. Thus, the Re-
statement (Second) does not help prevent bad financial data from
entering and polluting the business market. In fact, the occurrence
of negligent conduct will be more prevalent, resulting in harm to a
greater number of third parties. Significantly, the public will lose
faith in the accounting profession, and third parties will no longer
be able to rely on the audited statements. The accounting industry,
which has strived to be recognized as a profession known for its in-
dependence and expertise, will lose the confidence of the public.
Such a result will be disastrous to the business market as a whole.
CONCLUSION
Due to the role that the accountant plays in today's society,349 it
is necessary to require a duty of care for accountants with respect to
all reasonably foreseeable users350 of audited financial statements.
Third party reliance on audited financial statements is so foresee-
able as to approach certainty. The reasonably foreseeable approach
satisfies two public policy concerns: it deters accountants' negligent
346. 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
347. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977); see supra notes 139-70 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the Restatement (Second) approach).
348. Recall that the accounting industry has promulgated GAAS (generally accepted auditing
standards). See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing GAAS).
349. See supra notes 13-95 and accompanying text (discussing the expanding role of the ac-
countant in today's business economy).
350. See supra notes 171-216 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the reason-
ably foreseeable approach to the issue of accountants' liability).
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conduct, and it compensates wrongfully injured parties.
The Biy 3 51 decision has the unfortunate result of resurrecting the
arbitrary and inconsistent rule of the Restatement (Second). Adop-
tion of this rule betrays the expectations of third-party users whose
reliance makes the audit report valuable to the audited company. In
contrast, the foreseeability standard provides a just and logical limit
to an accountant's liability. Without a liability rule that enforces the
reasonable expectations of third-party users of audit reports and
provides incentive for due care, the result will be less careful audits,
increased transaction costs for loans and investments, and delay and
disruption in the processes of lending and investing. By recognizing
the unique purpose of an audit, the reasonably foreseeable approach
best matches the scope of liability with market expectations. Such a
rule is necessary so that investors and lenders will continue to have
confidence in audited financial statements, and so that the usual and
foreseeable users of these audit reports are fairly compensated when
they have been harmed by the occasional failure of an accountant to
meet the prevailing professional standards.
Denise M. Orlinski*
351. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
* Ms. Orlinski passed the CPA exam in May of 1991.
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